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INTRODUCTION

Local police surveillance of dissenters has a long, if sometimes obscure, history. Former New York City Police Commissioner Patrick
Murphy traced the origins of such surveillance in New York to an "Italian Squad," which sought as early as 1904 to curtail the illegal activities
of a group of Italian immigrants called the "Black Hand Society."' The
history of injuries flowing from local police surveillance is similarly
lengthy. As early as 1940, a congressional subcommittee published doct
Professor of Law, New York University Law School. A.B. 1957, Yale; LL.B. 1960,
Harvard. The author is one of the plaintiffs' attorneys in Handschu v. Special Servs. Div.,
No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 1971) (settlement order stipulation signed by attorneys
Dec. 30, 1980, but not yet signed by court). The author wishes to express his thanks to his
cocounsel, Martin Stolar, Jethro Eisenstein, and Franklin Siegel, as well as to Frank Askin,
Matthew Piers, and Douglas Cassel, to the staff at the American Civil Liberties Union and its
affiliates in Southern California, Michigan, New York, and Washington State, to the Center
for National Security Studies, to the National Lawyers Guild, and to the National Emergency
Civil Liberties Committee. Without the assistance of all of these, this article would have been
impossible to write.
1 Affidavit of Patrick V. Murphy at 2, paras. 5-7, Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No.
71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 1971) (in support of defendants' motion to dismiss); see a/ro
P. CHEVIGNY, COPS AND REBELS: A STUDY OF PROVOCATION 252-55 (1972) (discussing
political surveillance activities of New York Police Department).
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uments detailing "violations of free speech and rights of labor ' 2 by the
Intelligence Bureau of the Los Angeles Police Department. 3
The police bureaus and squads responsible for political surveillance
grew more active in the 1960s. 4 Part of the reason for the increased
activity was reactive; the squads simply had more work to do during
that decade of demands for reform and radical change. A deeper reason
for the vigor of police political surveillance in the sixties was that the
public increasingly recognized the legitimacy of demands for intelligence about the sources of the civil disturbances that were convulsing
American cities in those years. In a passage often cited as a justification
for increased surveillance, 5 the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (the Kerner Commission) noted that "[t]he absence of accurate information both before and during a disorder has created special
control problems for police."' 6 The Commission recommended that
police departments . . . develop means to obtain adequate intelli-

gence for planning purposes, as well as on-the-scene information for
use in police operations during a disorder.
An intelligence unit staffed with full-time personnel should be
established to gather, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate information

on potential as well as actual civil disorders. It should provide police
administrators and commanders with reliable information essential
for assessment and decisionmaking. It should use undercover police
personnel and informants, but it should also draw on community
7
leaders, agencies, and organizations in the ghetto.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration made available federal funding for local surveillance of the discontented 8 and the local
"red squads" 9 burgeoned.' 0
Civil libertarians and radicals began to learn about local political
2 A Resolution to Investigate Violations of the Right of Free Speech andAssemb.'y and Interference
with the Right of Labor to Organizeand Bargain Collectively, Part 61, Documents Relating to Intelligence
Bureau or Red Squadof Los Angeles Police Department: Hearingson S. Res. 266 Before the Senate Comm.
on Education andLabor, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 23507 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
3 Police political surveillance units like the Intelligence Bureau of the Los Angeles Police Department have long been referred to as "red squads."
4 See Donner, Theog andPractice ofAmerican PoliticalIntelligence, NEW YORK REVIEW OF
BOOKS, Apr. 22, 1971, at 7, 27.
5 See, e.g., Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 222-23, 265 A.2d 678, 685 (1970); Affidavit of
Patrick V. Murphy at 6, para. 22, Handschu (former Police Commissioner of the City of New

York).
6 THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 269 (1968) [hereinafter cited as KERNER REPORT].
7 Id.
8 See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, THE POLICE THREAT TO POLITICAL
LIBERTY 14-16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as POLICE THREAT].

9
10

See supra note 3.

See

FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
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surveillance and its possible misuse from the political crimes trials of the
late sixties and early seventies, which were based to a considerable extent on the testimony of police undercover agents."I These groups made
demands for control as police political surveillance squads expanded.
The activists' demands received further fuel following the Watergate
scandal and revelation of federal investigative excesses by the Senate
Select Committee to Study Intelligence Activities (the Church
Committee).12

The critics of police red squads' activities recognized the many dangers inherent in political surveillance. Overt appearances at public
gatherings by officers either well-known to the crowd as agents or recognizable by their cameras or other equipment, for example, could create
an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. The collection of people's
names and the compilation of political dossiers on those people through
secret attendance at public meetings or undercover work could compound the "chilling" atmosphere of fear and intimidation. Moreover,
these practices and other similar activities could produce specific harms.
The dissemination of information in political dossiers to public bureaucracies and private employers, for example, could result in false suspicion of criminal activity, damage to reputation, and loss of employment.
People's lives and the organizations in which they were involved could
be seriously disrupted by spreading false information calculated to cause
dissension and disruption. Critics also feared that undercover agents
would encourage dissident groups and individuals to commit crimes
with a political twist in order to neutralize those organizations and individuals. Finally, critics thought that the police might engage in unlawful searches and electronic surveillance for the purpose of collecting
political information.
Critics had good reason to fear potential abuses in local police surveillance activities. The Church Committee investigations established
that federal agents were guilty of some, if not all, of the activities mentioned above.13 Critics accused local police of similar abuses and in some
cases were able to document their contentions. 14 Even though in some
situations the police might deny that they had done such things, or even
deny that all of these activities constituted abuses, they were thrown on
the defensive; the police were obliged to say that they would not indulge
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AcrvmIEs, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., bks. IVI (1976) [hereinafter cited as CHURCH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT]; DOnner, supra note 4.
11 See generally P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 1.
12 CHURCH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, bk. III (detailing federal abuses
in conducting political surveillance).
13 See CHURCH COMMrITEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, bk. I, 86-93, 104-11, 192-98,

217, 225-49, bk. III, 1-371.
14 See, e.g., infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (Chicago); infra notes 110-11 and
accompanying text (Memphis); infra notes 207-30 and accompanying text (Los Angeles).
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in the vices of the federal investigators. In sum, the local police were put
in a position where they were forced to admit that real abuses of political investigation existed and to express their disapproval of such abuses.
The litany of surveillance abuses attributed to local political squads
is long and, in most cases, disputed. This article does not attempt to
establish the truth or falsity of critics' charges. Rather, the article will
consider the instruments that have been fashioned to control political
surveillance, including administrative guidelines, judicial decrees, and
legislation. In examining closely the course of agitation for reform in
selected jurisdictions, the article will focus on how the instruments for
control came to be devised and what success they have had. Pleadings,
together with such fugitive sources as newspaper stories, political polemics, and personal recollections, have been gathered' 5 to trace the pattern
of actions taken in six cities and two states: New York City, Chicago,
Los Angeles, Seattle, Memphis, Detroit, Michigan, and New Jersey.
In all eight locations, critics of political surveillance undertook institutional reform litigation, that is, "public law litigation" in the sense
familiar to us from major civil rights cases and the writings of Professor
Chayes.16 They sought far-reaching changes in police surveillance policies through prospective relief, in cases involving a congeries of abuses
and parties. The remedies, when any have been fashioned, are often far
afield from the rights alleged. 17 The cases are "political," in the sense
that they are intended to create systemic change, and they naturally
have led to a legislative solution when that avenue is open.
The substance of the relief in these cases is astonishingly alike,
whether the rules are made by judgment, by statute, or, when all else
fails, by regulation. One principal reason for the marked likeness is that
the legal and policy concerns surrounding police surveillance have acted
as a similar constraint in every case. Although the law governing police
surveillance activities undoubtedly is familiar to readers of this symposium, a brief review may create a useful framework for examination of
the cases analyzed in this article.
I
THE LAW OF POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN THE SEVENTIES

The Supreme Court has held consistently that the introduction of
15 These materials are described in great detail throughout this article because most of
them are relatively inaccessible and are not collected in any other single place. Copies of the
sources not publicly available are on file at the Comel Law Review.
16 See Chayes, Supreme Court 1981 Temr-Foreword: Public law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Chayes, Public Law Litigation]; Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Chayes, The Role of theJudge].
17 See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 16, at 4-5; Chayes, The Role of theJudge,
supra note 16, at 1293-94.
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an informer into the private life and affairs of a person does not constitute an invasion of privacy in the fourth amendment sense. 8 Thus, the
Court has not required police to show probable cause or obtain judicial
approval before using informers in an investigation. The Court also has
held that an informer's use of a concealed microphone to record electronically what an individual said in the informer's presence constitutes
no greater intrusion on the subject's privacy.' 9 In the Court's view, such
a recording is legally indistinguishable from an informer's oral or written report to his superiors.
For purposes of first amendment analysis, the Court has never
clearly distinguished between the introduction of an informer into a
political group, and the introduction of an informer into any other sort
of situation. 20 In Laird v. Tatum, 2 ' the Court failed to draw such a dis-

tinction in a case involving political surveillance conducted by the
United States Army. The Laird plaintiffs claimed that the mere existence of the Army's system of political surveillance chilled their first
amendment rights. 22 The Army "collected by a variety of means" files
and dossiers, allegedly to facilitate contingency planning for assisting
local authorities in civil disorders. 23 The means the Army employed to
gather information included undercover attendance at public meetings,
reference to local police records and published sources, and alleged use
of informers and infiltrators. 24 The Court held that the mere existence
of the files, without an allegation that the government used the files in a
manner that was "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory, ' 25 did not
constitute an injury to anyone and that the case therefore was not justiciable. In short, if authorities collected the information by lawful
means, the implied intimidation and threat experienced by the plaintiffs
as a result of the existence of the files did not give rise to a cause of
action.
The Court's position in Laird enabled Judge Weinfeld of the South18 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300-03 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206, 211 (1966). There are situations, however, in which use of an informer may violate
an individual's sixth amendment right to counsel. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264
(1980) (use of paid informant in prison violated sixth amendment).
19 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Such a recording may constitute a
violation of the fourth amendment, of course, if the recording is made by a third party concealed from the participants. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (use of electronic
surveillance without a warrant violates the fourth amendment).
20
See Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 210, 224 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951) (§§ 2 and 3 of Smith Act, which make it crime to knowingly or willfully advocate
overthrow or destruction of United States government by force or violence, do not violate first
or fifth amendment).
21
408 U.S. 1 (1972).
22 See id at 3.
23
24
25

Id at 6.
See id at 26-27 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id at 11.
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ern District of New York to write that "[t]he use of informers and infiltrators by itself does not give rise to any claim of violation of
constitutional rights."' 26 Other courts relying on Laird went on to hold
that no cause of action exists under the first amendment for the collection of names from bank records,2 7 for the attendance of plainsclothes29
men at public meetings,2 8 or for the collection of telephone records,
even when those acts are directed at individuals or groups engaged in
political or other expressive activity. The dissemination of information
collected has also been held not actionable, at least when the dissemina30
tion is made to other law enforcement agencies.
Underlying the results of the surveillance cases are police concerns
sufficiently powerful to persuade the courts, if not the critics of police
surveillance, that the judiciary must largely refrain from interfering
with police discretion. One cannot understand the shape of the present
law unless one grasps these concerns. One basic consideration is that
many crimes, including some with a political motive, could not be prevented or punished without the use of informers. 31 But this concern
alone should not be enough to warrant judicial restraint because the
same reasoning applies to many searches that require a warrant; just as
the mere existence of a warrant requirement does not prevent searches
and seizures covered by the fourth amendment, a warrant requirement
would not make the use of informers impermissible in criminal
investigations.
Of greater concern is the fact that the information that supplies
"probable cause" for an arrest or search ordinarily is derived from surveillance from an informant, from infiltration, or from some other sort
of intelligence. As Judge Ditter explained in Kenyatta v. Keley, 32 "concomitant with the duty to investigate the criminal must exist the privilege to investigate the suspect, for until information has been acquired,
26 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss).
27 See Fifth Ave. Vietnam Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326, 332-33 (2d Cir.
1973).
28 See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 510 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.), stay denied, 419
U.S. 1314 (1974) (Marshall, Circuit Justice).
Some courts have found, however, that the presence of uniformed or otherwise identifiable policemen may sometimes constitute a form of unlawful intimidation under the first
amendment. See Bee See Books Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622, 626-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(policeman stationed in bookstore); Local 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F.
Supp. 620, 625 (N.D. Ind. 1948) (policemen at union meeting).
29 See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979).
30 See Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d
1335, 1338 (3d Cir. 1975).
31 See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
("[W]ithout the use of such agents many crimes would go unpunished and wrongdoers escape
prosecution.").
32 375 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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classified, analyzed and disseminated, neither guilt nor innocence can
even be surmised. '3 3 Thus, one might argue that extension of the requirement of judicial approval to surveillance techniques such as keeping files and using infiltrators would make the law of probable cause
almost unworkable. For this reason, the Second Circuit refused to require the involvement of the judiciary "in exercising prior restraints on
34
an investigative agency in the executive or legislative branch."
The courts also have been reluctant to limit the kinds of information that the police may collect and keep, reasoning that police work
may require intelligence that is not directly related to crime. This reluctance was voiced by the Kerner Commission 35 and underlies the
Supreme Court's decision in Lairdv. Tatum, in which the majority wrote:
The data-gathering system here involved is said to have been established in connection with the development of more detailed and specific contingency planning designed to permit the Army, when called
upon to assist local authorities, to be able to respond effectively with a
minimum of force ...
The system put into operation as a result of the Army's 1967 experience consisted essentially of the collection of information about
public activities that were thought to have at least some potential for
civil disorder ....36
This background information did not directly figure in the Court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The Court's explanation of the Army's purpose in collecting the information, however,
conveys the Court's underlying belief that the mere existence of information in files is insufficient to state a claim because there may be an
excellent reason for keeping the information. Without such a reason,
the Court might have been more sympathetic to the plaintiffs' claim.
The period immediately following Laird was a low point for critics
of police surveillance. The courts seemed unwilling to impose limits on
police discretion either in their methods of collecting information or in
the kinds of information they collected. Situations existed, however,
that were impossible to explain under the policies used by courts to justify their decisions in surveillance cases. When infiltrators spread false
information among the members of an organization for the purpose of
s7 for example, the surveillance activity did not prevent
disrupting it,
crime, supply information necessary to aid an investigation or to establish probable cause, or further a legitimate, ancillary purpose. In such
Id. at 1177.
Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 510 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1974). Thus far,
courts have not chosen to pursue the alternative approach of requiring a warrant that would
issue upon a showing of less than probable cause.
35 See KERNER REPORT, supra note 6, at 269.
33

34

36

408 U.S. at 5-6.

37

See CHURCH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, bk. III, at 40-61.
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cases, some lower courts gradually fashioned a narrow body of law upon
which plaintiffs could rely. The Laird Court had conceded that governmental conduct affecting first amendment rights would be actionable if
it were "proscriptive." 38 Lower courts held that surveillance tactics may
be deemed "proscriptive" if they have a concrete effect on the life of a
subject of an investigation, apart from mere personal feelings of outrage,
and if the police use the tactics for the purpose of violating constitutional rights. 39
Thus, some federal courts have shaped a sort of constitutional
prima facie tort requiring actual injury and malicious intent. Proof of
deliberate disruption of political activity by police satisfies both the intent and the injury requirements. Courts have held that the dissemination of information in political files to persons outside the ambit of
police investigation may be actionable as well.4° Finally, courts have
permitted plaintiffs to prove their case by drawing an inference of unlawful intent from a combination of extensive surveillance over political
activities and the lack of any legitimate law enforcement purpose in conducting the surveillance. 4 1 Thus although the Laird decision seemingly
foreclosed the possibility of a cause of action to limit police surveillance
activities, some lower courts have developed a slim set of substantive
rights against political surveillance. The law has developed to the point
where an investigation may be held "proscriptive" and therefore actionable if it is done entirely for political, rather than law enforcement
purposes.
Even though plaintiffs in suits brought against police for improper
surveillance may be able to state a claim in certain circumstances, they
still may have difficulty obtaining the relief they desire. Although some
lower courts have fashioned limited substantive rights against political
surveillance, the Supreme Court created procedural difficulties for
plaintiffs by its decision in Rizzo v. Goode.42 The plaintiffs in Rizzo sought
relief for an alleged pattern of police brutality by the Philadelphia police department. They proved some twenty incidents of police abuse, a
38 408 U.S. at 11.
39 See Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 567-69 (E.D. Mich. 1979), vacated on other
grounds, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144,
149-51 (D.D.C. 1976); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
40 See Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d
1335, 1338 (3d Cir. 1975); Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 573 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (quoting
Philadelphia Yearlv Meeting), vacatedon other grounds, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 150-51 (D.D.C. 1976) (citing Philadelphia Yearly
Meeting).
41 See Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 568-69, 574-75 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (quoting
Berlin), vacated on other grounds, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 151 (D.D.C. 1976).
42 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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showing sufficient to satisfy the lower court of the existence of a pattern
of abuse.43 The district judge ordered the defendants to establish a formal procedure for citizen complaints. 44 The Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove a purposeful pattern of
46
behavior. 45 The Court specifically rejected the relief ordered below,

following a developing doctrine that "[r]emedial power is bounded by
constitutional right. '4 7 The Court further held that in structuring relief
a federal court should not intervene as deeply in the internal affairs of a
local agency, especially one concerned with law enforcement, as had the
48
district court.
After the Court's decision in Rizzo, the federal courts still could entertain cases for institutional reform of police practices if the plaintiff
pleaded and proved a well-defined motive and pattern of behavior on
the part of superior officials. 49 But the Rizzo Court clearly indicated to
federal judges that they ought to be chary of offering any systematic or
detailed relief in such cases. Given the Court's message in Rizzo, plaintiffs increasingly chose to repair to the state courts, particularly in jurisdictions where the courts were at all hospitable.
In the face of substantive and procedural doctrinal problems, cases
for institutional reform of local political surveillance went forward. Because these cases were directed against police practices that were both
very secret and very important to the government, the cases were among
the most ambitious of all public law litigations. Fortunately for the
plaintiffs, the political climate after the Watergate scandal and the
Church Committee investigations sometimes favored reform.50 Proponents of reform did not limit themselves to a judicial resolution; in addition to bringing suit in state and federal court, they sought a legislative
solution. In seeking legislative action, however, they were faced with the
recurring problems, in lobbying for reform, of getting on the legislative
agenda and then of securing a favorable result. As the following examination of the results of lobbying and litigation activities in six cities and
two states illustrates, the relief obtained was remarkably uniform and
generally less comprehensive than anticipated.

Set id at 373.
44 See id at 364-65; see also Council of Orgs. on Philadelphia Police Accountability &
Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1322 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
45 423 U.S. at 375.
46 See id at 380-81.
47 Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 16, at 51; see also Special Project: The Remedial
Process in InstitutionalReformLitigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV.784, 799, 854-55 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Special Project].
48 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 377-79.
49 See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 815-16 (1974).
50 See sufira text accompanying notes 11-13.
43
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II
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY:

NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE

Prompted by the major urban riots of the sixties, especially the
Newark riot of 1967, and on the advice of the Kerner Commission, the
Attorney General of New Jersey sought to strengthen the intelligence
capabilities of the state police. 5 1 The Attorney General issued a memorandum to local officials entitled "Civil Disorders-the Role of Local,
County and State Government" in which he wrote: "The State Police
Central Security Unit has distributed Security Summary Reports (Form
421) and Security Incident Reports (Form 420) . . .to each police de-

partment. . . .We urge you to see that this vital intelligence is commu'52
nicated to this central bureau for evaluation and dissemination.
Police were to use the Security Incident form to report events such as
"civil disturbance[s], riot[s], rall[ies], protest[s], demonstration[s],
march[es], confrontation[s], etc." 53 They were to use the Security Summary form to collect information on individuals. The incident report
solicited the names of the organizations and leaders involved in a disturbance together with a characterization, such as "left-wing, right-wing,
Civil Rights"; 54 the summary report sought the names of associates,
'55
memberships, and a "record of past activities."
In Anderson v. Sills,56 activists brought suit in New Jersey state court
protesting the policy enunciated in the memorandum and the use of the
report forms. Anderson, decided on appeal two years before Laird v.
Tatum, was one of the first of the major cases seeking systematic limits
on political surveillance. Not one of the most successful of police surveillance cases, Anderson anticipated many of the problems that were to
plague the plaintiffs in similar cases in the succeeding fifteen years. The
result in Anderson also presaged some elements of future solutions.
The Anderson plaintiffs, urban activists and a civil rights organization, sought from the New Jersey courts declaratory and injunctive relief
on the ground that the memorandum and the forms were overly broad
under the first amendment. In response to the Attorney General's motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The lower
court, in those palmy days for civil rights cases, granted the plaintiffs'
motion. 5 7 In reversing and remanding, 58 the New Jersey Supreme
51 See Anderson v. Sills, 106 NJ. Super. 545, 547, 256 A.2d 298, 299 (Ch. Div. 1969),
rev'd, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970), dismissedas moot, 143 N.J. Super. 432, 363 A.2d 381
(Ch. Div. 1976).
52
Anderson, 106 N.J. Super. at 548, 256 A.2d at 300.
53
Id at 559, 256 A.2d at 306.
54 Id at 560, 256 A.2d at 307.
55 Id at 566, 256 A.2d at 313.
56
106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A.2d 298 (Ch. Div. 1969), rev'd, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678
(1970), dismissed as moot, 143 N.J. Super. 432, 363 A.2d 381 (Ch. Div. 1976).
57 See Anderson, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A.2d 298 (Ch. Div. 1969).
58 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970).

1984]

LOCAL SURVEILLANCE

Court foreshadowed doctrines that later appeared in Laird v. Tatum. 59
The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish any personal
injury and went on to discuss the necessity of police surveillance
activities:
The police function is pervasive. It is not limited to the detection of
past criminal events. Of at least equal importance is the responsibility
to prevent crime. . . . In the current scene, the preventive role requires an awareness of group tensions and preparations to head off
disasters as well as to deal with them if they appear. To that end the
groups or organizations
police must know what forces exist, what
60
could be enmeshed in public disorders.
The court concluded that "[t]he basic approach must be that the executive branch may gather whatever information it reasonably believes to
be necessary to enable it to perform the police roles, detectional and
preventive. A court should not interfere in the absence of proof of bad
faith or arbitrariness. '61 Finally, the court held that if on remand the
lower court ultimately found any relief appropriate, "the restraint must
'62
be limited to the offensive matter.
As early as 1970, then, the Anderson case opened the issues of standing and justiciability, of the proper scope of surveillance, and even of the
limitation of the remedy to the scope of the right. Yet the New Jersey
Supreme Court had not dismissed the case out of hand; the plaintiffs
still were entitled to a trial. The possibility, however tenuous, that the
trial would lead to relief caused the state police to draft a new manual
for its Central Security Unit (CSU) in a successful effort to moot the
63
case.
The state police manual 64 is an elaborate administrative document
purporting to establish policies for the collection of intelligence concerning "social-political organized crime activity. ' 65 It requires the CSU to
maintain files on "individuals and/or groups that pose an actual threat of
59 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Still later, the case was actually to be swallowed by the Laird
ruling. See 143 N.J. Super. 432, 363 A.2d 381 (Ch. Div. 1976) (dismissing the action as moot);
see also infia text accompanying note 63.
60 56 N.J. at 222, 265 A.2d at 684 (citation omitted).
61 Id at 229, 265 A.2d at 688.
62 Id at 230, 265 A.2d at 689.
63 See 143 N.J. Super. 432, 363 A.2d 381 (Ch. Div. 1976).
64

DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION OF NEW JERSEY STATE PO-

LICE, NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE CENTRAL SECURITY UNIT MANUAL DELINEATING THE
SCOPE - FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONS (released Feb. 10, 1976).
65 Id at 8. The manual defines "social political organized crime" as "a group of persons

structured for the purpose of engaging in a continuing course of criminal activity wherein the
desired goal is a change in the existing political and/or socio-economic structure for the purpose of destroying, modifying or weakening the structure itself." Id at 28 (emphasis in
original).
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incitz)ng violent confrontation."66 This standard, viewed in isolation, places
virtually no restraint on the collection of intelligence. Thus, of greater
interest are the activities the manual prohibits and the bureaucratic procedures it requires for the collection and dissemination of information.
The manual forbids the collection of data about an individual
"merely" because of the individual's race or political affiliation or because the individual supports unpopular causes. 67 It prohibits the use of
an "Agent Provocateur," and the use of confidential information "for
political and/or economic purposes."'68 The manual mandates that
CSU officers may conduct photographic surveillance or disseminate information to other units only with the approval of the head of the
Unit.69 The manual further limits dissemination by requiring that the
recipients be law enforcement personnel. 70 Finally, the manual dictates
that the head of the Unit must conduct an annual audit and "purge"
71
outdated or "unreliable" information.
The restraints set forth in the manual presage the pattern for later
cases. By the middle of the seventies, scandal about surveillance abuses
and the substantive limits on surveillance suggested by the courts made
it untenable for the police to admit that they wished to conduct surveillance for political reasons. They therefore claimed that any such surveillance was incidental to a criminal investigation. The natural
solution, which appears repeatedly in one form or another, was for the
police to agree to refrain from surveillance forpurely political reasons, to
impose administrative restrictions on the use of intrusive methods, and
to limit the dissemination of information. Even with the limited bargaining power they had left after the decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, the Anderson plaintiffs were able to accomplish this
much as a purely administrative remedy.
The chief weakness of the New Jersey State Police Manual as a
means of remedying surveillance abuses is that the manual represents
only an administrative solution. There is no guarantee that the police
will follow the manual, nor is there any provision for punishment if the
CSU ignores the manual's restraints. If the Unit does follow the manual
and finds its limits too restrictive, the police are free to change it.72 In
sum, the New Jersey State Police Manual represents a very limited victory for critics of police surveillance.
Id at 9 (emphasis in original).
See id
68
Id at 9-10.
69 See id at 12.
70 See id at 20-21.
71 Id at 18-19.
72 See Elliff, The Attorne General's Guide/inesfor FBI Invstigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
785 (1984) (concerning changes in United States justice Department guidelines); see also infra
text accompanying notes 90, 209-18.
66

67
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III
FEDERAL LITIGATION: NEW YORK, CHICAGO, AND
MEMPHIS

In the mid-seventies, critics of political surveillance in New York,
Chicago, and Memphis sought to control the local police through federal civil rights actions. In addition to facing pervasive substantive law
limitations peculiar to police surveillance cases, plaintiffs confronted the
problems inherent in classic public law 73 litigation: pleading a pattern
of abuse and an unlawful purpose, notifying the persons who might be
affected, conducting discovery from recalcitrant defendants, and fashioning a suitable remedy. All three cases were pending at the same time
and all were interdependent to some extent.
In 1971, activists brought the first of these federal cases, Handschu v.
Special Services Division, 74 to curtail the surveillance practices of the New
York City Police, which had been revealed in the political trials of the
late sixties. 75 Proponents of reform expected great things from civil
rights actions against police abuses. 76 The plaintiffs' attorneys in Handschu hoped, for example, that the courts might finally require police to
secure a judicial warrant before conducting political surveillance.
The Hlandschu complaint was initially filed on behalf of a class of
'7 7
people who "object to governmental policies or social conditions.
The complaint alleged that the Special Services Division of the New
York City Police Department had maintained political dossiers, used
covert civilian informers and undercover police officers to infiltrate
political groups, and engaged in overt interrogation and surveillance for
the purpose of intimidating persons from participating in political activities. 78 It further alleged that the police had incited the subject persons
and groups to commit crimes, "fingered" activists later subjected to acts
of brutality, and unlawfully used electronic surveillance. 79 Significantly,
as it later turned out, the complaint claimed that all these acts were
"designed to chill, deter, discourage and inhibit plaintiffs . . . from
freely associating and communicating with others to advance. . . their
73 See supra text accompanying note 16.
74 No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 1971) (settlement order stipulation signed by
attorneys Dec. 30, 1980, but not yet signed by court).
75

See, e.g., S. BLACKBURN, WHITE JUSTICE: BLACK EXPERIENCE TODAY IN AMERICA'S

COURTROOMS (1971); P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 1; P. ZIMROTH, PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE
(1974).
76 See, e.g., Note, Use of § 1983 to Remedy Unconstitutional Police Conduct: Guarding the
Guards, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 104 (1970); Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for
UnconstitutionalPolice Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
77 Complaint at 2, para. 6, Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed
May 18, 1971).
78 See id at 5-10, paras. 28-50.
79 See id at 6-13, 17, paras. 35, 37, 40, 42-43, 47, 63-66, 87-88.
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dissenting beliefs and ideas." 80
From today's perspective, some of the relief sought is surprising.
Not only did the plaintiffs ask that the court enjoin the use of informers,
infiltrators, and electronic surveillance "except where authorized by appropriate authority, 8 1 but they also sought the destruction of the police
department's political files.8 2 Since the passage of the Freedom of Information Act8 3 and investigations of governmental misconduct, such files
are viewed as a precious historical and political resource. The preservation of the files against the wishes of the police who claim that they
would prefer to destroy them has become a major issue in many cases,
often more important than any other relief.
The defendants responded to the plaintiffs' claims in a number of
ways, beginning with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The Police Commissioner of the City of New York, Patrick V. Murphy,
submitted an affidavit in support of the motion in which he blandly
asserted that one mission of the Special Services Division was the collection of information about "groups or individuals whose purpose is the
disruption of governmental activities or the peace and harmony of the
community"8 4 and that during the sixties the Division had increased its
"close surveillance activities of groups that because of their conduct or
rhetoric may pose a threat to life, property, or governmental administration."8 5 The defendants appear to have had little of the sensitivity to
public fear of surveillance that was to develop among senior officials
during the next ten years.
Judge Edward Weinfeld, writing immediately after the Supreme
Court decided Laird v. Tatum,8 8 distinguished Laird and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. He set the tone for future cases by holding
that disruption of organizations, provocation to commit crime, and indiscriminate dissemination of files, when combined with an allegation of
unlawful purpose, were sufficient to constitute a specific harm to the
8 7
plaintiffs.
The defendants then sought to blunt the effect of the case by internal housecleaning, a measure that was to become a familiar pattern in
80 Id at 5-6, para. 29.
81 Id at 20, para. 100(5).
82 See id para. 100(3).
83 Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1982)).
84 Affidavit of Patrick V. Murphy at 7, para. 25, Handschu (quoting Murphy's order
dated June 24, 1971).
85 Id at 3-4, para. 12; see also Burnham, City Has Its Own Special Police to Keep Dossiers on
Dissidents, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1969, at 30, col. 5.
86 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
87 See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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other cities.88 The Special Services Division undertook a "purge" of
their files. They set aside more than a million documents but did not
destroy them, as police departments in other cases were to do. The Department also established guidelines in 1973 for the Special Services Division.8 9 Although the guidelines were entirely internal, contained no
sanctions, and could be ignored or changed at any time,9" they constituted a step forward simply because they recognized limitations on
political surveillance.
Finally, the defendants successfully sought to limit the plaintiffs'
discovery to issues that were relevant to the establishment of a class. 9 '
For years they deflected the discovery into collateral issues and motions
with the result that as late as 1978 the plaintiffs still were seeking discov92
ery on the issue of the establishment of the class.
While the case in New York was shunted off onto a siding of discovery, lawyers and investigators in Chicago were collecting information for
a similar action. Members of the Chicago Police Department's Subversive Unit infiltrated the Alliance to End Repression, one of the groups
planning the Chicago litigation, 93 as they apparently had done with a
number of other organizations. Finding that the Alliance intended to
file suit, the Department in 1974 destroyed files on thousands of individuals and organizations. 9 4 The Alliance filed suit almost immediately
88

See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 103 (Chicago); supra text accompanying note

110 (Memphis).
89 See Defendants' Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories, Exhibit 1,
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 1971) ("public security" guidelines).
90 See also Burnham, Police Share PoliticalUlesWith Others, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1973, at
38, col. 1.
In fact, the New York Police political squad apparently paid no attention to the guidelines. In a criminal case, People v. Collier, 85 Misc. 2d 529, 376 N.Y.S.2d 954 (N.Y. County
Ct. 1975), the case was dismissed because of misconduct in political surveillance. Surveillance
had been conducted over a period of two years, during which time the guidelines went into
effect. Yet the officials planning and supervising the investigation apparently made no effort
to tailor the investigation to comply with the new guidelines. Id at 537-38, 376 N.Y.S.2d at
964-65.
91 Defendants' Answers and Objections To Plaintiffs' Interrogatories at 1, Handschu
(quoting Judge Stewart's order of Aug. 8, 1973, granting defendants' motion to defer class
action determination pending discovery and limiting discovery to that necessary to define
class).
92 In 1978, plaintiffs' motion for sanctions for defendants' recalcitrance in answering
questions directed only at the establishment of the class was denied. See Transcript of Argument (Aug. 2, 1978) at 4, Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed May
18, 1971) (transcript of argument before Magistrate Sol Schreiber).
93 See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 435 (N.D. Ill. 1976), afd, 558
F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1977); Gutman, CombattingDefendants' Obstrutionism in the Discovery Process,
55 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 983 (1978) (discussing in detail discovery phase of Chicago litigation).
94 See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 FR.D. 438 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Gutman,
supra note 93, at 985, 988.
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thereafter. 95 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) brought a
similar action the following year, 96 and the two cases were consolidated
97
for discovery.
For the first few months, the Chicago cases closely followed the
course of the New York litigation. The Alliance complaint, like the complaint in Handschu v. Special Services Division, claimed that the Chicago
Police Department's political squad (then named the Security Section)
operated under a general mandate to gather intelligence "on those organizations or individuals which present a threat to the security of the
country, state, or city."98 The plaintiffs alleged that the police had engaged in surveillance, wiretapping, dissemination of information, infiltration of private meetings and organizations, summary punishment,
provocation, and unlawful entries and seizures, 99 all for the purpose of
"chilling, harassing, intimidating, and disrupting the plaintiffs' exercise
of their First Amendment rights."10 The complaint sought damages for
individuals and injunctive relief on behalf of the class, including destruction of the files. 10 1 The defendants made motions to dismiss in both
cases, which the court denied with heavy reliance on the reasoning and
the precedent of Judge Weinfeld's decision in Handschu. 102
After the court's denial of the motion to dismiss, the resemblance
between the New York and Chicago cases faded. The Chicago plaintiffs
forged ahead with their discovery. The police had made an enormous
tactical error in infiltrating the Alliance to End Repression and in destroying their own political surveillance files. The district court, believing that the police had acted in bad faith, issued a series of orders
enforcing discovery and imposing sanctions on the defendants, which
included making presumptive findings of fact against them.103 In 1976,
95 See Complaint, Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, No. 74-3268 (N.D. Ill. filed
Nov. 13, 1974).
96 See Complaint, ACLU v. City of Chicago, No. 75-3295 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 3, 1975).
97 See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(approving settlement with defendants City of Chicago and Department of Defense); Alliance
1981) (approving settlement
to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D. Ill.
with defendants FBI, Justice Department, CIA, and certain individuals).
98 Complaint at 11-12, paras. 60, 62, Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, No. 743268 (N.D. Ill. filed Nov. 13, 1974).
99 Id at 11-34, paras. 62-142.
100 Id at 12, para. 63. The complaint filed by the ACLU was substantially the same as
that filed by the Alliance. The ACLU complaint added claims against federal surveillance,
which are not discussed here. See Complaint at 12-38, ACLU v. City of Chicago, No. 75-3295
(N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 3, 1975).
101 Complaint at 34-35, para. 4, Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, No. 74-3268
(N.D. Ill. filed Nov. 13, 1974).
102 See ACLU v. City of Chicago, 431 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
1976) (denying
103 See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 428 (N.D. Ill.
defendants' motion to stop oral deposition); Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75
F.R.D. 435 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (enjoining defendants from joining plaintiffs' legal team and from
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Judge Kirkland also imposed on defendants the burden of proving that
they did not "[i]nstruct informers and undercover agents to provoke,
encourage, and solicit members of the target organization to participate
10 4
in unlawful activities."'
The plaintiffs' discovery revealed that the Chicago Subversive Unit
had in fact used surveillance for political purposes. Officers admitted
that in 1967 they had broken into the offices of the Chicago Peace
Council, Women for Peace, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the
Latin American Defense Organization and had stolen files, membership
lists, correspondence and office supplies, for the purpose of "disrupting"
the organizations and "destroy[ing] the left.' 0 5 The infiltration of the
Alliance to End Repression, 10 6 an organization established to reform the
Chicago Police Department's surveillance tactics, was itself an act the
department could not justify as necessary to a "criminal" investigation.
By 1977, the plaintiffs had obtained discovery of the Chicago political surveillance files under a protective order. 0 7 The defendants were
not in a position to withstand more bad publicity and became more
interested in settling the suit.
Before discussing the final Chicago settlement, it will be helpful to
examine the decree previously entered in the Memphis litigation. Activists in Memphis brought a federal civil rights suit against the Memphis
Police Department's political surveillance activities' 08 while the Chicago
case was moving into discovery in 1976, but settled the case in 1978,
three years before the final settlement of the Alliance case. The Memphis
settlement, the first of its kind, undoubtedly influenced the final resolution of the Alliance case.
The Memphis case, Kendrick v. Chandler,109 was prompted by a
newspaper report that the Memphis police were on the verge of destroyusing any evidence so obtained), afd, 558 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1977); Alliance to End Repres1976) (imposing sanction on defendants for failure
sion v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438 (N.D. Ill.
to answer interrogatories); Gutman, supra note 93, at 992.
104 Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438, 441 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
105 A Red Squadder Deposed, RIGHTS, Oct.-Nov. 1981, at 6, 7-8 (excerpt of deposition of
John Valkenburg, patrolman with the Intelligence Division of the Chicago police department); see ACLU Plaintiffs' Response and Statement to Class Members Regarding Objections of Certain Alliance Plaintiffs to the Injunction Settlement with the City of Chicago,
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, No. 74-3268 (N.D. Ill. filed Nov. 13, 1974); see
also Improper Police Intelligence Activities: A Report by the Extended March 1975 Cook County Grand
FIRsr PRINCIPLES, Jan. 1976, at 3 (detailing improper gathering and dissemination of

ju,

intelligence data by members of the Security Section of the Chicago Police Department's
Intelligence Division).
106 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
107 See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 542-43 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (paras. 26-28 of Findings of Fact in settlement with City of Chicago and Department of
Defense).
108 See Complaint, Kendrick v. Chandler, No. 76-449 (W.D. Tenn. filed Sept. 10, 1976).
109 No. 76-449 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 1978).
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ing their political files.' 10 The plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants from destroying the files, but
the mayor and the chief of police claimed to have destroyed them before
the order could be served. Although the officials' action subjected the
defendants to future sanctions of the court, the mere threat of sanctions
probably would not have been enough to induce the defendants to settle. When copies of highly embarrassing bits of the "destroyed" files
turned up in police department offices outside the political section, however, the defendants yielded to the double pressure of bad publicity and
the possibility of an adverse court ruling."' The injunction entered
pursuant to the consent judgment in Memphis was the first of its kind
and thus influential in subsequent cases.
Prospective relief of the sort sought in police surveillance cases is
particularly difficult to construct because the relief inevitably limits
what courts view as the broad discretion traditionally exercised by the
police in conducting investigations. Part of the solution is to forbid all
surveillance undertaken purely for political purposes. This approach
was used in the Memphis decree and is consistent with the results of the
case law. The Memphis decree provides that the defendants shall not
operate any bureau, use any electronic surveillance, employ any informant or infiltrator, disseminate any damaging information, or engage in
any other action, such as recording names or taking photographs at a
' 12
demonstration, "for the purpose of political intelligence." "
By the mid-seventies, police departments could accept this sort of
provision because they claimed that they no longer undertook surveillance for political purposes. The more difficult problem from the police
departments' point of view arose in bona fide criminal investigations of
criminal acts that happened to contain political elements. The police
believed that judgments about such "mixed" investigations would have
to be made on a case-by-case basis. Critics of police surveillance believed that if the judgments were made ad hoc by officers in the field,
the mixed investigations would become indistinguishable from political
intelligence investigations.
The Memphis decree contains the framework of a solution to the
"mixed" investigation problem. It provides that every "lawful investi110

See Kendrick v. Chandler, No. 76-449 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 1976) (order granting

temporary restraining order), dissolved as moot, Kendrick v. Chandler, No. 76-449 (W.D. Tenn.
Sept. 20, 1976) (order dissolving temporary restraining order and denying temporary
injunction).
111 See Domestic Intelligence Reform: A Court Order Against a Red Squad FIRST PRINCIPLES,
Oct. 1978, at 1; Conversation with Jack Novik, Staff Attorney, ACLU (Aug. 1983).
112 Kendrick v. Chandler, No. 76-449, at 3-4, paras. C-F (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 1978)
(Order, Judgment, and Decree). The decree defines "political intelligence" as "the gathering,
indexing, filing, maintenance, storage or dissemination of information, or any other investigative activity, relating to any person's beliefs, opinions, associations or other exercise of First
Amendment rights." Id at 2, para. B(4).
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gation of criminal conduct which investigation may result in the collection of information about the exercise of First Amendment rights,"
requires the approval of the Director of Police."13 The Director's authorization expires after ninety days, although it is renewable, and is to
state in writing that:
a. The investigation does not violate the provisions of this Decree;
and
b. the expected collection of information about, or interference with,
First Amendment rights is unavoidably necessary for the proper conduct of the investigation; and
c. Every reasonable precaution has been employed to minimize the
collection of information about, or interference with, First Amendment rights; and
d. the investigation employs the least intrusive technique necessary
14
to obtain the information.
These provisions of the decree at least would require the department to
think carefully before initiating surveillance and to create a "paper
trail" by which their thinking could be retraced. The Memphis decree
also prohibits the police department from disseminating personal information, even if obtained in accordance with the decree, except to "another governmental law enforcement agency then engaged in a lawful
investigation of criminal conduct."" 15
Finally, the most important feature of the Memphis decree, and
others like it, is simply that the decree is an injunction. As such, the
decree subjects the police to the continuing jurisdiction and sanctions of
a federal court and cannot be changed at the whim of a new police
administration.16 Even the most innocuous provisions of a decree, such
as a prohibition of surveillance for purely political purposes, may become powerful tools for the public if police policies do not comply with
the terms of the decree.
The Memphis decree was consistent with then existing case law
concerning politically motivated surveillance and dissemination but
outdistanced the case law in bureaucratic control of discretion. 117 Although the Police Director was comfortable with the decree,' 18 critics of
113
114

115

Id at 4, para. G(1).
Id at 4-5, para. G(2).
Id at 5, para. H(2).

116 In the Chicago litigation against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, Judge Getzendanner enjoined certain changes in the United States Justice Department
"Guidelines on Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations" on the ground that they violated provisions of the settlement in that case. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of
Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
117 See supira notes 18-49 and accompanying text.
118 E.W. Chapman, Director of the Memphis Police Department, stated: "Since I've
been here [since 1976] I have insisted that any surveillance be done in connection with an
ongoing investigation. [The ACLU] wrote the decree around the way I operate the depart-
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political surveillance could have been dissatisfied with it for a number of
reasons. The decree failed to set forth any standard to govern decisions
to initiate mixed criminal-political investigations, to wrest control of
such decisions from the police department, or to provide any appeal or
audit of the decision of the Police Director. In fairness, these are recurrent and intractable problems encountered in all the cases and ordinances discussed in this article.
The plaintiffs in the Chicago federal case incorporated the basic
protections of the Memphis decree into their settlement, but attempted
to avoid its shortcomings. The negotiated agreement 19 in the Chicago
litigation was wisely written as a "political" document, intended to obtain public support as well as to establish rules governing the initiation
and conduct of police political surveillance. The agreement's statement
of principles recognizes the importance of the first and fourth amendments and of effective law enforcement, and announces a city policy
that "[n]o investigation shall be conducted for political, religious or personal reasons. First Amendment information may be gathered only for
20
valid governmental purposes in accordance with this Judgment."1
The Chicago agreement limits the applicability of its provisions to investigative activities "directed toward First Amendment conduct' 12 1 ordinary
criminal investigations or investigations "that merely [include] incidental
references to [first amendment] conduct"' 122 are not subject to the decree's
ment and I don't think it will change our present mode of operations." POLICE THREAT,
supra note 8, at 77.
119 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree). The decree does not settle individual damage claims.
120 Id at 560 (Preliminary Statement of Principles § D(1)). A subsequent section forbids
harassment of any person because of the person's first amendment conduct. See id at 562
(Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 2.2).
121 Id. at 561 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 1.1) (emphasis in original) Section
1.5 of the decree defines this as "conduct protected by. . . the First Amendment," id at 562,
including, for example, the right to hold and to communicate beliefs, id (Agreed Order,
Judgment and Decree § 1.5.1-.5.2), to associate and assemble, id (Agreed Order, Judgment
and Decree § 1.5.3), to "advocate alternative systems of government," id. (Agreed Order,
Judgment and Decree § 1.5.5), and to advocate "'the use of force or of law violation, except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless conduct and is
likely to incite or produce such action,'" id (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 1.5.4)
(quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)). The decree authorizes a preliminary
inquiry to determine the facts under this standard, id (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree
§ 1.5.4), but does not authorize full investigations except on a showing of reasonable suspicion
of crime, id{ at 564 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.2.2.), and in accordance with
standards under § 3.2 of the decree. See in/ra note 136.
122 Id at 561 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 1.1.1) (emphasis in original); see alro
id at 561-62 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 1 passim). Section 1.4 of the decree
defines "incidental reference" to be one where the conduct itself is not a significant issue or
the focus of the investigation, and the information and the reference is relevant to the law
enforcement purpose. Id at 562 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 1.4.1-.4.2). An example of an incidental reference is "information that a community organization was a burglary victim." Id (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 1.4).
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restraints. The police may disseminate information garnered through
surveillance only to Chicago and federal law enforcement authorities in
connection with criminal investigations or "to another governmental
law enforcement agency upon its signed written request certifying that
the information is needed in a criminal investigation based upon reason1 23
able suspicion of crime."
In all investigations directed toward first amendment conduct, the
Chicago decree prohibits the collection of information about first
amendment activities unless it is "necessary to and inseparable from the
purpose of the investigation."'124 The decree requires that police use
minimization procedures to reduce an investigation's impact on first
amendment conduct. 125 The Superintendent of Police or a member of
26
his executive staff must authorize all such investigations in writing
and explain the factual basis of the investigation. 127 The authorization
lasts only thirty days, although it may be renewed. 28 The decree also
provides that police investigators may direct intrusive methods of investigation, such as the use of informers, infiltrators, or any form of electronic surveillance and mail covers, against first amendment conduct
29
only with similar written authorization and minimization procedures.
One of the most creative sections of the decree forbids use of the intrusive method of "nonconsensual seizure,"' 30 defined as the "acquisition of
a person's private papers . . .without a judicial warrant or the person's
prior express consent." 1 3' This provision clarifies by decree an area of
law that is still in conflict; 32 it implies that obtaining personal documents by stealth or misrepresentation is a "seizure" in the fourth
amendment sense, 133 and requires police to secure a judicial warrant
34
before engaging in such activities.
The negotiating parties in the Chicago litigation tried to foresee
and provide for all the contingencies that might arise in connection with
the general order-keeping functions of the police. As a result, the Chicago decree contains more than the single distinction between "criminal" and "political" investigations. The decree provides that the police
Id at 564 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.1.6.4) (emphasis in original).
Id at 563 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.1.1).
See id (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.1.2).
See id (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.1.4).
See id (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.1.4.1)
See id (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.1.4.2).
Id at 567-68 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.6).
130 Id at 567 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.6.2.4) (emphasis in original).
131 Id (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.6.1.5) (emphasis in original).
132 See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (distinguishing Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)); Y. KAMiSAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 489-90 (5th ed. 1980).
133 See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 567 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.6).
134 Id (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.6.2.4).
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
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department may conduct investigations directed toward first amendment activity only in four classes of cases: criminal, dignitary protection,
public gathering, or regulatory investigation.135 The decree sets forth a
thicket of standards that trigger the requirement of written executive
permission for each category of investigation. Authorities may begin a
criminal investigation only upon "reasonable suspicion based on specific
and articulable facts that the subject has committed, is commiting, or is
about to commit a crime."'1 36 Police may initiate a dignitary protection
investigation only upon a "reasonable suspicion that the subject(s) of the
investigation poses a threat to the physical safety of the dignitary."' 3 7 A
public-gathering investigation, necessary to ensure traffic flow and public safety, may be begun without approval for the purpose of collecting
announcements and making overt contact with the planners of the gathering or demonstration; 138 a more detailed investigation may be begun
only on "reasonable suspicion that the publicgathering is likely to produce
an imminent and substantial breach of the peace or riot or that the
information on a permit application is false. ....
A regulatory investigation directed at first amendment conduct, such as a license application, "shall be conducted solely for the purpose of fulfilling regulatory
responsibilities .... 140 Provisions such as these, honeycombed with
details and exceptions, are obviously the fruit of compromise and the
potential subject of future administrative errors.
The provisions prescribe use of the stop-and-frisk standard of reasonable suspicion rather than the more stringent probable cause standard in authorization decisions. Reasonable suspicion was chosen
because probable cause is a standard for arrest and is thus a standard to
be met at the close of an investigation; if police had to meet a probable
cause standard at the beginning of an investigation, investigations ar14 1
guably would be almost impossible to initiate.
Finally, the Chicago decree provides for audits of its implementation by the Superintendent annually, by the Police Board (a civilian
oversight body) as appropriate, and by an independent auditing firm at
"139

135
136

Id at 563-68 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3).
Id at 564 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.2.2) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
in original). The standard is that for a stop-and-frisk. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
The decree also provides for a short "emergency" period in which the police may conduct
criminal investigations without executive written approval. See Alliance to End Repression v.
City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 564-65 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Agreed Order, Judgment and
Decree § 3.2.4).
137 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 565 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.3.2) (emphasis in original).
138 See id at 566 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.4.4).
139 Id (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.4.5) (emphasis in original).
140 Id at 567 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 3.5.1).
141 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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least every five years. 142 The decree states that the auditors shall have
access to all information except the identification of informants and
143
matters related to current criminal investigations.
The Chicago decree thus contains the kernel of the Memphis settlement: isolation and prohibition of purely political investigations, limitations on dissemination, and establishment of bureaucratic review of
mixed cases by superiors in the department. The Chicago decree, however, goes beyond the Memphis settlement by providing for separate
controls on intrusive methods, an explicit standard to guide the Superintendent or his delegate in giving written approval, and an independent
audit.
The class of plaintiffs established for the Chicago case consisted of
all persons in the city "who engage or have engaged in lawful political,
religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these
activities, have been within the last five years, are now, or hereafter may
be, subjected to"' 44 the practices alleged against the defendants. The
class definition swept in an enormous number of people, all of whom
were entitled to comment on the decree and some of whom lodged objections to it.
The most substantial objection to the Chicago decree centered on
the argument that the decree would legitimize some police spying; because the distinction between the forbidden and the permissible depended on the relatively fluid standard of reasonable suspicion, the
police always could justify their spying by finding some excuse to term
their investigation a criminal investigation. As the Socialist Workers
Party protested, "this means when the cops want to get something on
u4
the people they think they ought to get something on they can do it.'
This is a perennial objection, 146 to which there is no easy reply. A
standard is always subject to linguistic manipulation, especially when
the standard is administered internally, as is the Chicago decree. The
malleability of an internally administered reasonable suspicion standard
undoubtedly was one of the reasons behind the defendants' refusal to
agree to a true warrant system administered by a neutral party for the
approval of "mixed" investigations. But even the interposition of a neutral party would not entirely eliminate the problem of potential manipulation of the standard. Magistrates are notoriously compliant in
142 See Alliance, 561 F. Supp. at 568-69 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 5).
143 See id at 569 (Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree § 5.3).
144 Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 976 (7th Cir. 1977).
145 Socialist Workers Party (Chicago), The Cause of Civil Liberties Is Not Served By the
Chicago Red Squad Settlement: Why We Oppose "Lesser-Evilism" in the Fight for Democratic Rights 2 (1981) (pamphlet) [hereinafter cited as SWP Pamphlet]; see also The Alliance/ACLU Settlements: A Dissenting Viewpont from the Movement (Oct. 2, 1981)
(pamphlet).
146 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 198.
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granting warrants, and even when they are not, nothing prevents an
applicant from making representations that will satisfy an exacting
official. 147
This principal complaint registered by critics of the Chicago settlement is, in the last analysis, a general objection to the use of legal language in decrees as a means of resolving social problems. The tenor of
other objections14 8 entered by the dissenting members of the class in the
Alliance case evidenced the dissenters' unwillingness to settle the case on
any terms. They wanted a trial, in which the misconduct of the defendants would be detailed in testimony and reported in the newspapers,
thereby affecting public attitudes. By implication, the dissenters cared
little if the trial resulted in a decree that was less favorable to the plaintiffs than the negotiated decree because the dissenters had no faith in the
efficacy of any decree. The dissenters considered the case "political" not
in the sense that it sought institutional and quasi-legislative change,1 49
but in the sense that the discovery and trial were part of a process of
political agitation and organization for change. In their view, the court
and its resolution of the case was ancillary, in essence no more important
than any other source of information. Thus, the dissenters judged any
compromise counterproductive, because it tended to legitimize the police and the courts' 50 and to preclude the publicity and potential for
agitation available at trial.
The plaintiffs' attorneys could give no effective answer to objections
rooted in such differences of principle, although they did point out that
the objections misconceived the nature of the settlement process, and
that the court had already found some facts about police wrongdoing. 151
The question remains, given the amount of evidence of police wrongdoing they apparently possessed, why the lawyers did not simply take the
case to trial and thus satisfy the objectors. Judge Getzendanner's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Concerning the Settlement make
clear why that would not have been a wise choice:
147 See Kamisar,Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionag Rule Rest on a 'RnczpledBasis" Rather
Than an "EmpiricalAroposition"? 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 570-71 (1983).
148 See SWP Pamphlet, supra note 145, at 2; Letter from G. Flint Taylor, Dennis Cunningham & Jeffrey Haas, Chicago People's Law Office, to Richard Gutman (May 6, 1981)
(containing statement of objection to Alliance settlement); Letter from Donna-Marie Gilligan,
Attorney for the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance, to Richard Gutman (Apr. 30, 1981) (containing statement of clients' objection toAlliance settlement). These
objections concerned the settlement's failure to contain proof or admissions of illegal activities
by the police.
149 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
15o "'It is. . . important that we guard against efforts to amend the police apparatus so
as to separate people from each other, obscure the real target of police repression, and leave
the basic apparatus intact."' Open Letter from G. Flint Taylor & Brian Glick for the Chicago People's Law Office (May 1, 1981) (quoting Kenneth E. Tilsen's Keynote Address at the
National Conference on Government Spying (Jan. 1977)).
151 See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.

1984]

LOCAL SURVEILLANCE

The legal protections conferred upon the plaintiff classes by the
proposed City of Chicago Settlement not only correspond well with
the relief sought in the complaints, they also go far beyond the legal
relief plaintiffs would likely have obtained if the cases had gone to
trial. Counsel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the City of Chicago
defendants all recognized that the Court would not likely have entered such a detailed and restrictive injunction following trial, assuming plaintiffs prevailed ...
Absent the proposed settlement, plaintiffs' proof of their case at
trial would have encountered a number of difficulties, some of which,
in other litigation involving similar issues, have seriously hampered or
proved fatal to proof of the plaintiffs' case. These include the risk that
the claim for declaratory and injunctive relief would have been denied as moot.
Also, there was the risk that even if the plaintiffs prevailed on the
merits, and their claims for injunctive relief were held not moot, the
Court might nonetheless decline to issue an injunction, or might issue
an injunction less protective of their rights than the provisions of the
152
proposed settlement.
The representatives of the city agreed to settle, not because they
feared that a post-trial decree would be more sweeping than the one
they actually signed, but rather because the city wished to reject the
misdeeds of a former administration and to avoid the publicity of a trial.
In short, the stipulation contained more relief than a trial would have
yielded, a peculiar consequence of the fact that a court usually does not
alter a negotiated settlement.1 53 The decree's restructuring of the administration of surveillance, for example, was considerably more detailed than that which the Supreme Court had rejected as an excessive
intrusion into local affairs in Rirzo v. Goode. 154 If the plaintiffs had requested different relief after a trial, such as a judicial warrant requirement for the use of intrusive methods, the Chicago court probably
would have been forced to deny it, under the RiLzo doctrine that

152 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 551 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(paras. 18-21 of Conclusions of Law in Settlement with City of Chicago and the Department
of Defense). The danger that the plaintiffs' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief would
have been denied as moot stemmed from the possibility that if the plaintiffs were no longer
subject to surveillance, they might now lack standing. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 37273 (1976) (plaintiffs lacked requisite personal stake in outcome when claims rested on what
one of small unnamed minority of policemen might do to them); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (case-or-controversy requirement demands more than general assertions
that plaintiffs will be subjected to discriminatory practices if they violate unchallenged laws).
153 See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 548 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (para. 5 of Conclusions of Law in Settlement with City of Chicago and Department of
Defense); see also Special JFroject, supra note 47, at 809-12.
154 423 U.S. 362 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
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"[r]emedial power is bounded by constitutional right,"' 55 because the
Constitution simply does not require surveillance warrants. 56 The defendants undoubtedly refused to agree to such a warrant requirement,
except in the one context in which it suited them to do so, 15 7 because
they knew that the court would never impose the requirement upon
them.
In the Chicago Findings and Conclusion, Judge Getzendanner reminded the parties that "[m]ore important than any internal enforcement mechanism, of course, is the character of the settlement as an
injunction enforceable by the Court."'1 58 Within a few months of signing the decree in 1981, Judge Getzendanner illustrated the importance
of the decree's injunctive nature. Shortly after the decree was signed,
the Chicago Police made films and still photographs of a demonstration
protesting the nuclear arms race. The police apparently had made no
effort to obtain written approval from the Superintendent or his delegate for these activities. The plaintiffs moved for contempt and, on July
8, 1982, the court found that the defendants had violated the "public
gathering" provisions of the decree. 159 The court further found that the
officers who made the film had not even been informed of the content of
the decree. 16

The court's willingness to enforce the settlement suggests an answer
to those who objected to the decree on the grounds that it was ambiguous and foreclosed further use of the case as an instrument of political
agitation. If the police department ignores the decree and engages in
abuses that are indisputably violations, the decree provides some protection in spite of its potential ambiguity in other contexts. More importantly, the case can continue to serve as a rallying point for political
activity because of the continuing jurisdiction of the court under an equitable decree. 16 1 The decree creates rights against political surveillance
that are broader than those afforded by the Constitution; the new rights
can contribute to political consciousness in the same way the more limited constitutional rights do, if citizens recognize them and complain
about their violation.
The New York case is moving toward a conclusion similar to that of
the Chicago suit, although by a much more devious route. Shortly after
155 Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 16, at 51; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
158 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 550-51 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (para. 16 of Conclusions of Law in Settlement with City of Chicago and Department of
Defense).
159 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, No. 74-3268 (N.D. Il. July 8, 1982)
(order finding defendants guilty of violating the Agreed Order, Judgment, and Decree).
160
161

Id

See supra text accompanying note 158.
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the class had been established in the Chicago case, 162 the New York
plaintiffs sought class action status. The New York plaintiffs relied on
the Chicago case as a precedent, as the Chicago plaintiffs had once used
the New York case to resist a motion to dismiss, and redefined the class
in the same terms used in Chicago. After the New York class was established in 1979,163 the defendants began serious settlement discussions,
because at that point nothing remained for them but more discovery.
The plaintiffs, having fought an uphill battle for eight years were also
amenable to settlement. In fact, as Judge Getzendanner pointed out in
the Chicago litigation, the dynamics of the procedural and substantive
law make settlement very tempting because the plaintiffs' power to
carry out discovery is potentially great, while the power of the court to
grant relief after trial is limited.t64 Thus, the endemic problems of political surveillance litigation and the constraints of the case law made settlement attractive to the parties and shaped a result that, although
arrived at independently, was similar to other settlements.
The New York stipulation, like other settlements, prohibits any investigation of "political activity,"' 65 defined as "[t]he exercise of a right
of expression or association for the purpose of maintaining or changing
governmental policies or social conditions,"1 66 except in connection with
a criminal investigation or the planning of a public event.16 7 The stipulation specifies, however, that such mixed criminal investigations can be
carried out only by the Public Security Section (PSS) of the Intelligence
Division under the supervision of an Authority made up of the First
Deputy Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner for Legal Matters
(both police department functionaries), and a civilian appointed by the
Mayor. 168 The New York stipulation provides that the PSS may begin
an investigation if it submits an investigation statement to the Authority
containing "specific information. . . that a person or group engaged in
political activity is engaged in, about to engage in or has threatened to
engage in conduct which constitutes a crime." 1 69 Within thirty days,
the PSS must present a request for approval to the Authority, who may
162 See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1977).
163 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1979) (memorandum opinion and order certifying action as class action).
164 See supra text accompanying note 152.
165 Stipulation of Settlement and Order ai 3, § IV(A), Handschu v. Special Servs. Div.,
No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 1971) (settlement order signed by attorneys Dec. 30,
1980, but not yet -signed by court).
166 Id at 3, § II(A).
167 Id at 3, § IV(A), (B), (C).

§§ III, IV.

168

Id at 3,

169

Id at 3, § IV(C). In response to a Socialist Workers Party interrogatory, the defend-

ants stated that because "[m]ere rehetoric [sic] or theoretical advocacy" of revolution is not a
crime, it is not a predicate for investigation." Defendants' Amended Responses and Objections to Interrogatories of Socialist Workers Party, at 3, Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No.
71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 1971).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:735

either terminate the investigation or permit it to continue beyond the
first thirty days. 170 The stipulation provides that the PSS may use undercover infiltrators in such cases only with the express approval of the
Authority, 17 1 but it allows plainclothes officers to be present at "public
activities of political organizations" without separate approval if they
are part of an investigation for which proper statements and applica172
tions have been filed with the Authority.
The stipulation also limits the types of information the PSS may
gather and the grounds upon which it can start a file on a particular
subject. Without the written approval of the Authority, the PSS may
not maintain records indicating that a person has signed a petition, has
his name on a mailing list, supports a group by contributions, or has
"authored" a political or religious writing. 173 The political, religious, or
sexual preference of an individual or organization may not be the sole
1 74
basis of a PSS file.
In connection with a public event, the PSS may seek information
such as the date, time, and place of the event and any expectations of a
counterdemonstration through open contact with the organizations
planning the event "in order to preserve the peace, deploy manpower
for control of crowds and to protect the right of individuals to freedom
of speech and assembly."' 75 The stipulation prohibits the PSS from
conducting more intrusive public event investigations unless they are
criminal investigations approved by the Authority. 176 Finally, the stipulation requires that the PSS keep information concerning the planning
177
of events isolated from their other records.
The stipulation limits the PSS's dissemination of materials gathered
through its surveillance activities. The PSS may disseminate its records
with the approval of the commander of the PSS, but only to law enforcement agencies or government agencies conducting security clearances. 178 The stipulation requires that the PSS maintain a written
1 79
record of such requests and disseminations.
The New York stipulation provides three monitoring mechanisms
170 See Stipulation of Settlement and Order at 3, § IV(C) (3), Handchu.
171 See id at 3-4, § IV(C)(6).
172 See id at 4, § IV(CD(7). This provision resulted from the Second Circuit decision
holding that there is no constitutional objection to the mere presence of officers at public
meetings. See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 510 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.) ,stay denied, 419
U.S. 1314 (1974) (Marshall, Circuit Judge); supra note 28 and accompanying text.
173 See Stipulation of Settlement and Order at 4, § VI(B), Handshu.
174 Seeid § VI(C).
175 Id at 3, § IV(B). The section enumerates the categories of information the Public
Security Division may obtain in connection wtih the "Event Planning Inquiry." Id
176 See id
177 See id
178

Id

179

See id at 5, § VII(E).

at 4, § VII(A).
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in addition to the provisions for prior approvals by the Authority. First,
the commander of the Intelligence Division reports annually to the Authority concerning compliance with the stipulation. 1 0 Second, the Authority must report to the Mayor and the Police Commissioner with a
statistical analysis of the PSS's work.' 8 ' Finally, groups or individuals
that suspect that they have been included in the PSS files may make an
inquiry of the Authority. 8 2 If their name appears in the file, the PSS
must disclose the facts to the Authority, and "[i]f such file does not exist
(appear) or if the Authority's inquiry reveals that an investigation was
conducted in conformity with these Guidelines, the Authority shall notify the requesting party that if such an investigation was made it was
conducted in conformity with these Guidelines."' 8 3 If the Authority
finds, however, that the investigation was not conducted in a lawful
manner, the Authority must notify the Commissioner, who must take
disciplinary measures. 18 4 The settlement also requires the Authority to
inform the subject of the investigation, who may examine the material
unless the Authority determines that disclosure would jeopardize an on85
going criminal investigation or an individual's safety.
One issue that proved to be impossible to resolve through negotiation was the disposition of the New York red squad's early records, particularly the records isolated in the "purge" conducted at the beginning
of the case. 186 The defendants were determined to destroy the files; the
plaintiffs were determined to keep them. A complete stand-off exists
today, with the records in almost the same situation they would have
been in had no litigation arisen: the defendants are to dispose of them
"inaccordance with law."' 8 7 For limited periods, individuals and representatives of organizations may inspect old political files gathered on
them except where the file has been maintained properly under the
standards of the stipulation or is related to a current investigation. 188
89
Any denial of inspection is appealable to the Authority.
Finally, the stipulation acts as a final adjudication, disposing of equitable claims for the class and settling "[a]ny claim [of the class] for
damages based solely upon the collection and/or retention of informa180
181
182
183

184
185
186

Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id
See

§ VIII.
§ IX.
at 4, § V.

§ V(A).

§ V(B)(3).
id § V(B)(4).
See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.

187 Stipulation of Settlement and Order at 1, para. 2(a), Handrchu. The import of this
term was a chief bone of contention for those who objected to the settlement. See infra text
accompanying note 193.
188 Stipulation of Settlement and Order at 2, para. 4, Handachu.
189

Id
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tion... by the New York City Police Department."' 9
The New York stipulation provoked criticism, just as the Chicago
settlement did at approximately the same time. Over the many years of
litigation, the plaintiffs' lawyers had not kept the members of the class
fully apprised of the case's progress; the proposal took most of them by
surprise. Many members felt as though they first had been brought
under the net of a class action, and then had had their rights settled
without their full participation. 19 1 Thus, the result of establishing a
sprawling class definition in hopes of ensuring that rights created under
any decree would affect the greatest number was that many of those
affected were mistrustful of the settlement.192
The objectors to the New York stipulation were dismayed by the
provision allowing older files to be "disposed of in accordance with law,"
at first believing that the phrase was an invitation to destroy the records.
The plaintiffs, however, pointed out, and the City admitted in answers
to the objectors' interrogatories, that the phrase implied that the documents would pass to the jurisdiction of New York City's Department of
Records. 193 Moreover, some access to the records was available under
the New York Freedom of Information Law. Many objectors, however,
for whom the principal value of the case lay in the revelations made
through discovery, felt that this limited access was grossly insufficient.
In their view, only an order preserving and revealing the records would
constitute significant relief.
A second controversy arose over the clause settling damage claims
"based solely on the collection and/or retention of information."' 94
Some objectors feared that this waiver covered claims for surveillance
Id at 2, para. 7.
191 Plaintiffs' attorneys gave notice of the settlement by newspaper publication, a method
found adequate by the court in light of the size of the class. See Handschu v. Special Servs.
Div., No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1981) (memorandum opinion and order finding notice of
settlement adequate and directing additional newspaper publication of notice).
192 See Hentoff, Chicago Shows Us Yokels How to Leash a Red Squad, Village Voice, June 24,
1981, at 8, col. 1; Hentoff, How We All Got Screwed in the N.Y Red Squad Case, Village Voice,
June 17, 1981, at 8, col. 1; HentoffAfeniShakur v. New York Civil Liberties Union, Village Voice,
June 10, 1981, at 8, col. 1; Hentoff, NYPD's RedSquad Goes Legit, Village Voice, June 3, 1981,
at 1, col. 1. But see Neier,A Time to Settle, Village Voice, July 1, 1981, at 14, col. 1. See generall
The Red Squad Controvery, NATION, July 11, 1981, at 43; Tell, Liberals See Red Over "Red Squad"
Pact, Nat'l L.J., July 6, 1981, at 5, col. 1.
193 See NEw YORK, N.Y.C. CHARTER §§ 3004, 3005 (Supp. 1983-1984); N.Y. PUB. OFF.
LAW §§ 84-90 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) (Freedom of Information Law); see also Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Settlement at 6, Handschu v. Special Servs.
Div., No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 1971): Defendants' Amended Responses and Objections to Interrogatories at 5, para. 66, Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71-2203
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 1971); Defendant's Responses and Objections to Further Interrogatories of Objectors National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee et. al. at 5, Handschu v.
Special Servs. Div., No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 1971).
194
Stipulation of Settlement and Order at 2, para. 7, Handschu.
190
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with an unlawful purpose or by unconstitutional means; 195 for them, the
clause represented the plaintiffs' lawyers' attempt to waive some very
important claims on behalf of the class. The City admitted, however,
that the waiver covered only those claims found nonjusticiable in Laird.
Tatum, 196 and did not reach claims based on unconstitutional methods
97
of collecting information.
Objectors pointed out, as had the Chicago dissenters, that the settlement allowed for surveillance without a judicial warrant and used an
ill-defined distinction between "criminal" and "political" cases to mark
the limits of permissible surveillance. 9 Neither the New York nor the
Chicago settlement required that police obtain a judicial warrant before
engaging in surveillance because the Supreme Court has held that the
Constitution does not require a surveillance warrant.199 Thus, the federal courts probably have no power to provide such relief.
The New York settlement also suffered in comparisons drawn between it and the Chicago decree, chiefly because, in critics' eyes, the
Chicago decree allowed greater civilian control over police surveillance
activities through the decree's provision for civilian auditors.20 0 The
critics failed to note, however, that the Chicago decree, like the Memphis decree, allows the police chief to approve surveillance without civilian input, while the New York settlement provides for civilian
participation in the approval process.
Behind this technical difference lies a genuine difference of principle. Both the New York and Chicago plaintiffs' lawyers agreed that, in
the absence of a judicial warrant requirement, effective reform required
an institutionalized procedure for approval of surveillance that would
eliminate ad hoc decisions in the field and guarantee that police reflect
before beginning an investigation, leaving a "paper trail" for review
purposes. Beyond that, the New York lawyers thought it important to
have the input of some civilian who might act as a brake and sometimes
a "whistleblower." They regarded civilian input in the authorization
195 See, e.g., Hentoff, How We All Cot Screwed in the N.Y Red Squad Case, Village Voice,
June 17, 1981, at 8, col. 1.
196 408 U.S. 1 (1972); see supra notes 18-49 and accompanying text.
197 See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Settlement at 1-6, Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 1971). Defendant's Response
and Objections to Further Interrogatories of Objectors National Emergency Civil Liberties
Committee et. al. at 5, Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18,
1971).
198 See, e.g., Hentoff,NYPD's Red Squad Goes Legit, Village Voice, June 3, 1981, at 1, col. 1;
see also supra text accompanying note 145 (discussing similar objection to Chicago settlement).
199 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
200 See, e.g., Hentoff, ChicagoShows Us Yokels How to Leash a RedSqua, Village Voice, June
24, 1981, at 8, col. 1 (arguing that Chicago's "reasonable suspicion" standard for beginning
investigation is more precise than New York's "specific information" standard). But see
Neier, A Time to Settle, Village Voice, July 1, 1981, at 14, col. 1 ("I have been looking closely at
legal language for many years and I am unable to discern the difference.").
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process as important enough to justify bargaining for such a provision.
In contrast, the Chicago lawyers felt that civilian oversight in the authorization stage was not as crucial as other elements for which they
fought in negotiating the Chicago decree. As Matthew Piers, one of the
Chicago plaintiffs' lawyers, explained:
My Chicago co-counsel and I never had much faith in the efficacy of
any oversight authority. It's just too easy for the secret police to secrete. We therefore focused our efforts on establishing strict investigative standards which could be used by the victims the next time we
201
catch the inevitable Son of Red Squad ....
Arguments can be made in support of either view. If a compliant
authorizing board makes hash of a strict standard, one must hope that
such activity will be caught in the net of a future review. If the reviewing body employs lax standards or if the original decision is unlikely to
be reviewed, then one must hope that the initial authority makes
thoughtful decisions. The choice between fighting for meaningful review and fighting for careful initial authorizations, if the choice must be
made, ultimately depends on whether one pins one's hopes on the initial
decision concerning the investigation or on the review. If forced to
choose, I would argue that the initial decision is more important than a
review because even the most critical reviewing body will tend to approve the original decision and because it is obviously preferable to prevent, rather than to remedy, abuses. The sad fact is that none of the
compromises is entirely satisfactory; a strict investigative standard, an
independent warranting body, and an independent reviewing body are
needed.
The most sweeping objection to the New York settlement grows out
of the case's class action status and the prospective nature of the relief it
provides. As the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee said in
its statement of objection to the New York settlement:
By this proceeding it is proposed to make all of those persons,
including, we would suppose, persons not now living in the City or,
indeed, not yet born, [subject] to a series of rules affecting their rights
and the correlative rights of the Police Department.
It appears that the function the court is being asked to perform in
this lawsuit is a typical legislative function and not a judicial one.
The making of rules to govern the relationship between residents of
and visitors to this city with the Police Department, regardless of
whether such persons have any existing controversy with the Department or its members, is a typical legislative function and could not
properly be decreed by a court even after full litigation of the issues
201
Letter from Matthew Piers, Attorney for Plaintiffs in Chicago Litigation, to Editor,
Village Voice at 3 (July 13, 1981) (unpublished) (emphasis in original).

1984]

LOCAL SURVEILLANCE

20 2
and certainly not as a result of a settlement with the plaintiffs.

Such an objection is essentially an attack on public law litigation in
general, or at least on political rights suits like the New York case. The
critics' position implies that a case attacking political surveillance upon
grounds of principle is not like other cases; it is a confrontation with the
State that the plaintiffs' lawyers cannot compromise in the same way as
other cases.
The plaintiffs' lawyers reached a contrary conclusion: they had a
duty to compromise given the constraints of the controlling case law.
They believe that when the court signs the stipulation, it will represent a
better decree than any they could have won by litigating the case to a
conclusion because of the Supreme Court's strictures on the remedial
powers of the federal courts. Thus, the plaintiffs' attorneys reasoned
that the class could obtain satisfactory relief only by compromising some
issues of principle in a negotiated decree. Ironically, it was this negotiation and compromise that opened the plaintiffs' attorneys and the stipulation to criticism. The necessity of compromise is a sad indication of
how far the existing state of the law lies from the original aims of the
case.

The strong point of a negotiated decree for the lawyers is that it
presents a fait accompli to the court, subject to the court's approval or
disapproval; for the court, this is the most troublesome aspect of a settlement. The judge has very little power to shape the document that the
parties present to him. He must decide whether it represents an advance over existing law, whether it actually sanctions practices that are
at present illegal, and then, whether he should sign it or reject it.203 As
of the date of this writing, the court has not signed the New York
stipulation.
IV
STATE COURTS AND CITY LEGISLATURES:

Los

ANGELES,

MICHIGAN, DETROIT, AND SEATTLE

One way to avoid some of the difficulties the plaintiffs encountered

in the New York, Chicago, and Memphis cases may be to stay out of the
federal courts in cases challenging local police surveillance activities.
Since the New Jersey state court challenge, critics of political surveillance have initiated state litigation in California, Michigan, and Washington. Rather than relying exclusively on the courts, however, critics
have also lobbied city legislatures in their efforts to change police surveillance policies and practices.
202

Statement of Objection to The Proposed Settlement in the Above Proceeding at 3,

Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71-2203 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 1971) (National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee).
203

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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Los Angeles

The California Supreme Court has been solicitous of civil liberties,
extending criminal defendants protections under the state constitution
that the federal Supreme Court declined to find in the United States
Constitution.20 4 In one major surveillance case, the California court
held that undercover infiltration of university classrooms for the purpose
of compiling political dossiers is a violation of rights guaranteed by the
state and federal Constitutions. 20 5 Plaintiffs in political surveillance
cases, then, might reasonably expect a more favorable treatment in a
California state court. Moreover, the political squad of the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD), the subject of various waves of scandal for
the past sixty years, is a natural candidate for reform. 20 6 The current
drive for reform began, as it did in many other cities, when the Los
Angeles Police "purged" their files.
In 1975, the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners20 7 disclosed that the Public Disorder Intelligence Division (PDID) had destroyed some two million "outdated" intelligence files on "potentially
disruptive" groups during the previous year. 20 8 The police destroyed
204 See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272 (1976). In Disbrow, the
California Supreme Court declined to follow the rule stated in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971), that statements made voluntarily by a criminal defendant during pretrial interrogation that are inadmissible as affirmative evidence at trial because of failure to comply with
Miranda may be introduced to impeach the defendant's trial testimony. Asserting "the independent nature of the California Constitution," the court held that the use of inadmissible
statements as impeachment evidence was prejudicial per se and required automatic reversal.
Id at 114-16, 545 P.2d at 280-81; see also People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099
(1975) (holding that Article 1, section 13 of California Constitution imposes "higher standard
of reasonableness" for searches and seizures than fourth amendment of United States Constitution as interpreted in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
205
See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222 (1975). In addition, California has a
liberal standard for taxpayers' standing in cases dealing with allegedly illegal expenditure of
public funds to finance police investigatory activities. As a result, individuals and organizations other than those actually or potentially affected by surveillance activities also have
standing in California to bring suit. Cf supra note 144 and accompanying text (class definition in Chicago litigation). Unlike federal cases, suits in California may be brought by concerned taxpayers. See, e.g., White, 13 Cal. 3d at 762-63, 533 P.2d at 225-26.
206
The defendant in White, for example, was the Chief of Police of the Los Angeles
Police Department. See also Hean'ngs,supra note 3; Transcript of Hearing at 1-3, In re Consideration of a Statement Relative to the Public Disorder Intelligence Division (PDID), Item
No. 4A (Bd. of Police Comm'rs of Los Angeles Jan. 18, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Transcript
of Hearing].
207
The Los Angeles City Charter establishes a Board of five commissioners for the "control and management" of the police department. Los ANGELES, CAL., CITY CHARTER
§ 70(b) (1967). The Mayor appoints the members of the Board of Police Commissioners to
five year terms subject to the approval of the City Council. Id §§ 72-73. Detroit and Chicago have instituted similar Boards of Commissioners for the police. See, e.g., infra note 258
(Detroit).
208
POLICE THREAT, supra note 8, at 36; see also The Los Angeles Police Spy Dispute, in
Sappell, Commission to Abolish Police Intelligence Units, L.A. Times, Jan. 19, 1983, at 22, col. 3
[hereinafter cited as Spy Dispute].
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the files in connection with the promulgation of new guidelines designed
to define the functions of the PDID, 20 9 as had their New York counterparts after the filing of the Handschu case. The guidelines, the Standards
aid Procedures for the LAPD, PDID Files, suffered from the perennial
shortcomings of such reform efforts: they contained no sanctions for
noncompliance and were subject to unilateral change. In addition, they
provided very little guidance to the officer in the field. The Standards'
statement of principles and purposes only generally defined the proper
subjects of police surveillance: "[T]he political and personal beliefs or
preferences of any individual, group, or organization are not of relevance or of concern to the Department. Individuals and organizations
are of concern to the Department only when there is a substantial threat
that their activities will result in public disorder. '210 The Standards
went on to provide that the PDID could maintain files only on individuals or organizations that "threaten, attempt, plan or perform acts disruptive of the public order," or which "assist" such organizations.2 1'
The files were to contain only information "relevant to past or possible
future disruptions of the public order. '2 12 The Standards also limited
the PDID's dissemination of files to law enforcement agencies 2 13 and
2 14
required the PDID to keep a written record of such disseminations.
Finally, the Standards provided for an audit of the PDID by the Board
of Police Commissioners to monitor compliance with the guidelines.2 15
Citizens concerned that the guidelines did not provide outside review organized groups to oversee the workings of the PDID.2 16 In the
209 Board of Police Commissioners, Standards and Procedures for the Los Angeles Police
Department Public Disorder Intelligence Division Files 1 (adopted Dec. 16, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as LAPD Standards].
210 Id
211 Id at 3, §§ II(A), (C),

III.

212 IM at 5, § V(A). The provision directs the PDID to destroy all information not meeting this standard before filing any source material or making any card entry.
213 Id at 6, § VII(A). The PDID could provide the information to certain defined law
enforcement agencies, id at 7, § VII(E), exclusively on a "need to know" basis, i.e., only when
"the requested information is both useful and necessary in assisting [the] law enforcement
agency in preventing acts disruptive of the public order," id at 6, § VII(A), (B).
214 Id at 7-8, § VII(F).
215 Id at 8-10, §§ VIII, IX. The monthly review by supervisory personnel was to include
a review of each PDID file, the removal and destruction of all outdated and irrelevant information, the removal and destruction of unnecessary files, and the submission of a report to
the Board of Commissioners. The semiannual audit by two members of the Board of Commissioners was to consist of a review of current PDID regulations and a report on the extent of
compliance by the PDID. Id
216 In August 1977, the American Friends Service Committee, with the support of the
American Civil Liberties Union, began a program on police surveillance which succeeded in
organizing a coalition of civil liberties, civil rights, and political groups, including, besides the
organizations named above, some 35 community groups. Called the Citizens' Commission on
Police Repression (CCOPR), this organization serves as "a clearinghouse for information and
research" and provides "coordination for community action, public education, litigation, and
legislative reform." POLICE THREAT, supra note 8, at 38.
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next few years, several of the groups active in the efforts to curb political
surveillance discovered that PDID officers had infiltrated their
groups, 2 17 thus clearly demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the 1976
Standards in preventing abuses. 21 8 Various individuals and groups affected by the PDID's abuses brought some six lawsuits, now consolidated into one, Coalition Against Police Abuse v. Board of Police
Commissioners, 21 9 in the state court. The consolidated complaint sought
injunctive relief and damages, under the United States and California
Constitutions, for invasion of privacy and interference with free expression and association. It alleged that PDID officers infiltrated some
twenty-three organizations, disrupting their internal affairs by creating
dissension and distrust among the members. 220 A principal claim was
that "this illegal surveillance and monitoring has been conducted by the
defendants for the purpose of monitoring plaintiffs' political activities
because these activities have included public criticism of the LAPD, and
its officials, and because these activities have included criticism of the
'22 1
political status quo."
In response to the plaintiffs' allegations, the Chief of Police, Daryl
Gates, continued to take the official position, commonly adopted in the
middle seventies, that the Department did not condone investigations
for political reasons. At a meeting of the Board of Commissioners in
1980, he scoffed at the idea that the PDID had infiltrated the Citizens
Commission on Police Repression (CCOPR), saying, "why do they
(CCOPR members) believe we are interested in them? . . . We can't
clutter our files with that nonsense. ' 222 Information obtained during
discovery in the consolidated litigation nevertheless showed that undercover agents had indeed infiltrated CCOPR and other similar oversight
groups. 223 Officers in the field apparently did not understand or did not
feel bound by the guidelines endorsed by senior policymaking officials.
In the months that followed, further revelations from the discovery
materials made the "Police Spy Dispute" into a major news item, with
frequent front-page stories in the local newspapers. Investigators established, for example, that the PDID kept files on major and minor politi217 PDID undercover officers were discovered to have infiltrated, among other organizations, the staff of an underground newspaper, see id at 38-39, the Coalition against Police
Abuse, see id at 41, the Campaign for Democratic Freedoms, see id at 42, and the Committee
on Nuclear Information, see id at 41-42.
218 See LA. Police ChiefProbedforMisleadingStatement on Surveillance, ORGANIZING NoTEs,
Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 3 [hereinafter cited as L.A. Police ChiefProbed].
219 No. 243-458 (L.A. County Ct. filed Dec. 16, 1982).
220 See First Consolidated Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Damages
at 4, 25-26, paras. 2, 100; Coalition Against Police Abuse v. Board of Police Comm'rs, No.
243-458 (L.A. County Ct. filed Dec. 16, 1982).
221 Id at 25, para. 99.
222 LA. Police ChiefProbed,supra note 218, at 3.
223 See Cooper, Spies over Los Angeles, INQUIRY, Jan. 1983, at 10.
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cians, a judge, "and the President of the Board of Police Commissioners,
2
its own oversight body.

24

The Board of Commissioners adopted yet another set of guidelines
for PDID procedures in 1982,225 in which the Department finally recognized the principle that a distinction exists between criminal and political investigations.2 26 The Board of Commissioners claimed that these
were "the toughest in the country," 22 7 yet they were still only "guidelines." The overall effect of the Board of Commissioners' activities was
to enable the police department to placate the public, while freeing all
other political forces from the necessity of intervening in police matters.
Neither the City Council nor any executive entity was obliged to intervene as long as the Commissioners were ostensibly taking active reform
measures.
At the close of 1982, discovery in the consolidated litigation began
224 See id.; Spy Dispute, supra note 208; Sappell, File on Judge Foundin Police Spy Documents,
L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1983, at 1, col. 5; Sappell & Wallace, OicerAdmits to Storing Police Spy
Files at Home, L.A. Times, Jan. 7, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
225 See Los Angeles Police Commission, Standards and Procedures for the Collection of
Intelligence Information by the Los Angeles Police Department Public Disorder Intelligence
Division (proposed Feb. 24, 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Standards].
226 The 1982 PDID guidelines' statement of principle forbids information-gathering "on
any organization unless its ideology advocates criminal conduct and its members have
planned, threatened, attempted or performed such criminal conduct," id.at 2, para. 2 (emphasis in original), or on any person unless that person is the leader of such a group or has
himself engaged in such acts, id. at 3, para. 2.
The 1982 guidelines attempted to define proper investigatory procedures more precisely
and to establish more effective bureaucratic monitoring of those procedures. They provide
that the PDID may undertake a preliminary investigation "upon a reasonable indication that
the individual or organization is planning, performing, threatening or attempting unlawful
acts that could result either in significant disruption of the public ordcr or in harassment on
the basis of race, religion or national origin." Id at 8, § III(A)(1) (a) (emphasis in original). A
preliminary investigation required the prior approval of the commander of the PDID, id
§ III(A) (1)(c),
and could not be conducted through the use of infiltration or electronic surveillance, id at 10, § III(A)(1)(e). The PDID could open a "file" and conduct a "full investigation" only when the preliminary investigation had yielded corroborated evidence of unlawful
acts as defined in the Statement of Principle. Id at 11-12, § III(A)(2) (a). The Commanding
Officer of the PDID had to authorize the opening of each new file in writing, setting forth the
basis for the conclusion that there was corroborated evidence of a reasonable indication of
planned or attempted unlawful acts. See id at 12, § III(A)(2)(b).
Under the 1982 guidelines, investigators could use infiltration and electronic surveillance
only with the written authorization of the Director of the Office of Special Services, and only
when less intrusive means were not "available." The director's authorization had to include a
showing of probable cause for the belief that the surveillance was appropriate and necessary.
Id at 12-14, § III(A)(3). It is unclear whether "probable cause" was essential or merely a
factor to be taken into account in the authorization decision.
Finally, the PDID was given the mission of collecting information on "terrorist trends,"
as well as protecting dignitaries and monitoring public gatherings. See id at 16-20, § III(B)(E). The "public gathering" passage, see id at 17-20, § III(E), apparently was modelled on
the Chicago decree, forbidding as it does the use of intrusive techniques as well as plainclothes
surveillance, unless the uses are otherwise authorized. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
227 Spy Dispute, supra note 208, at 22, col. 3-4.
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to turn up evidence that confirmed activists' worst nightmares about use
of the supposedly "purged" police files. PDID officers had not in fact
destroyed all of the files in 1976; allegedly, they had offered some files to
the school system and had given others to military intelligence.2 28 Further investigation showed that certain PDID officers were extremely upset at the prospect of destroying information they had worked so hard to
obtain. After some discussion, they had taken various measures to protect the information. 229 Jay Paul, a detective with the PDID, had kept
dozens of boxes of "purged files," apparently with the approval of his
23 0
superiors.
The pressure for legislative action prompted by this evidence would
seem irresistible, but the movement for a legislative solution once again
was blunted by the Board of Commissioners. The Board voted on January 18, 1983, to abolish the PDID and retain the records for "final disposition."' 23' The abolition was largely a public relations gesture; the
question remained whether the police department's political surveillance practices would be truly changed or merely reallocated and transferred. On May 9, 1983, the Board made clear that it would pursue the
latter course. Although various nonpolitical divisions assumed the responsibilities for dignitary protection and public gatherings, the Board
reestablished the "Anti-Terrorist Division" (ATD), governed by standards little different from those set forth in the earlier guidelines.2 32 The
division commander was to report directly to the chief of police, who
228 See Sappell, LAPD Offered Files to Schools, Ojtial Says, L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1982, at 1,
col. 5. An associate Los Angeles school superintendent claimed that police department personnel had offered him and a subordinate files on school employees, but he had refused them.
He also claimed that he had "reasonable cause" to believe the military had accepted a similar
offer. Id at 1, cols. 5-6, at 3, col. 3.
229 See Sappell, LAPD's No. 2 Man UnderScnatiy in Inquiby Over Files, L.A. Times, Mar. 15,
1983, at 1, col. 5 (metro ed.). Besides attempting to place documents with other agencies, see
supra note 228, members of the PDID, apparently with the consent of the assistant chief of
police, shielded various documents by labelling them "investigators' 'private notes'," id
230 See Sappell, SanctionedRemoval of Sy Data,Probers Told, L.A. Times, Feb. 9, 1983, at 1,
col. 5 (morning final ed.); Sappell & Wallace, supra note 224, at 1, col. 1.
231 Transcript of Hearing, supra note 206, at 5. In support of his motion to deactivate the
PDID, Commissioner Tooley gave a history of intelligence gathering by the Los Angeles Police Department and summarized his views of the PDID: "Recent events have led me to
conclude that PDID has not been operating in the manner contemplated by Commission
guidelines. Also, it seems evident to me that. . . it threatens to tarnish the reputation of the
Department as a whole." Id at 4. The Board passed the motion unanimously. Id at 14.
232 See Sappell, Police Intelligence Given to New Unit, L.A. Times, May 10, 1983, at 1, col. 5;
Intradepartmental Memorandum from Police Comm'n Subcomm. on Intelligence Reorg. to
Bd. of Police Comm'rs (May 9, 1983) (concerning "reorganization of anti-terrorist intelligence function") [hereinafter cited as Reorganization Memorandum]. After outlining certain
policies for ATD personnel and record transfers from the PDID, the Reorganization Memorandum specifically recommends that the Board of Commissioners "confirm by Motion in
public session that [the 1976 and 1982] guidelines will continue in full force and effect over
the new anti-terrorist division." Id at 5.
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was to have the exclusive power to authorize undercover operations. 23 3
Apart from these organizational changes, business was to continue as
usual.
Considering the dimensions of the scandal over the PDID's activities, the Board's attempted resolution of the problem was disappointing.
The Los Angeles City Council, at last, was moved to action. In July of
1983, the Council passed an ordinance giving the subjects of the old
PDID files limited rights of access to them. 234 The City Council appar-

ently was not ready to approve controls on future surveillance, however,
until it was forced to do so by the pressure of litigation. In February
1984, on the eve of trial in the consolidated case, the Council and the
Board of Commissioners agreed to a settlement that provided a damage
award to the plaintiffs of $900,000 and a new framework for police
investigations.235

The Los Angeles consent decree provides that "investigations on
individuals and organizations shall not occur unless there is a reasonable
and articulated suspicion that said individual or organization is planning, threatening[,] attempting or performing a significant disruption of
the public order. ' 236 The decree goes on to impose special limitations
on "undercover investigations," which are those investigations conducted by officers who assume fictitious identities to obtain information. 237 Undercover investigations

are forbidden "unless

there is

probable cause to believe. . . said individual or organization is committing or seeking to commit significant disruptions of the public order and
only after such a determination on probable cause has been made by at
233 Reorganization Memorandum, supra note 232, at 6.
234 Los Angeles, Cal., Freedom of Information Ordinance of 1983 (July 6, 1983) (amending Los ANGELES, CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 12, ch. 1, ch. 2, art. 2) (access to public records)
[hereinafter cited as L.A. Freedom of Information Ordinance]. The ordinance lists a number
of categories of records that are not subject to disclosure, including those whose disclosure
would "[i]nterfere with an ongoing investigation or enforcement proceeding," "[d]eprive a
person of the right to a fair trial," or "[e]ndanger the life or physical safety of any person." Id
at § 3.
The police also may withhold a record "where. . .the public interest served by not
making record public clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record."
Id at § 4. The police department's chief lobbyist was particularly active in regard to passage
of this provision as part of the ordinance. See Boyarsky, Council Passes Watered-Down Police File
Law, L.A. Times, July 7, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
235 See Coalition Against Police Abuse v. Board of Police Comm'rs, No. 243458 (L.A.
County Ct. Feb. 22, 1984) (Stipulated Consent Decree and Judgment and attached appendix
A, containing Standards and Procedures for the Anti-Terrorist Division, LAPD, Jan. 31,
1984) (ATD standards)).
236 Id at 3, para. 2(vii). The term "significant disruption of the public order" is defined
in the ATD standards to mean "unlawful acts which can reasonably be expected to result in
death, serious bodily injury or significant property damage and which are intended to have
such results to further societal objectives, to influence societal action or to harass on the basis
of race, religion or national origin." Id app. A, § III(N), at 5.
237 Id app. A, § III(S), at 6.
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least two members of the Police Commission. 238 On its face, this provision seems to require that police secure an administrative warrant, issued upon probable cause, before using undercover infiltrators; such a
warrant requirement would make the Los Angeles provision singularly
protective in comparison to analogous provisions in the decrees entered
in all other police surveillance cases. The term "probable cause to believe," however, is defined in a way that seems to blunt its force in the
1984 Standards and Procedures for the Anti-Terrorist Division, which
are incorporated in the consent decree. 23 9 The term is defined to mean
that "there is a good faith reasonable belief that the use of an undercover investigation will, when taken in conjunction with the facts gathered in the Full Investigation (including the facts gathered by the
undercover operator), lead to the probable cause to arrest the targets of
said investigation. ' 240 Once again, then, because of the logic of the investigative function 24 1 and the dynamics of compromise, the constitutional probable cause standard has eluded the plaintiffs in a police
surveillance case. Nevertheless, the Los Angeles consent decree does institute an important reform: civil approval, in the form of Police Com242
mission authorization, is required for an undercover investigation.
The settlement leaves open some issues that may provoke further
litigation. The consent decree does not distinguish clearly between
"political" and "criminal" investigations, although the ATD standards
to which the decree refers state that the ATD's "primary function" is the
prevention of "significant disruption of the public order. '243 The consent decree also permits investigations in "situations where advocacy of
a criminal act is in and of itself a crime" or "to the extent necessary to
confirm that statements made are in fact merely advocacy. ' 244 These
provisions seem to raise questions as to what sorts of investigations the
settlement affects. The provision regarding enforcement of the consent
decree also illustrates the decree's ambulatory nature: "At the present
time this Court does not enter any injunctive order, however [sic], the
Court hereby reserves and retains jurisdiction to amplify, modify, supplement, amend or terminate the orders set forth above, including providing for injunctive relief if necessary and appropriate. ' 245 Although
the decree at present carries no sanction of contempt, any attempt by
238
239
240
241

Id at 3, para. 2(viii).
Id at 4, para. 3.
Id app. A, § I(M), at 5.
See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
242 See Coalition Against Police Abuse v. Board of Police Comm'rs, No. 243-458, at 3,
para. 2(viii) (L.A. County Ct. Feb. 22, 1984) (Stipulated Consent Decree and Judgment and
attached appendix A, containing ATD standards).
243 Id app. A, § II, at 3.
244 Id at 3, para. 2(vi).
245 Id at 5, para. 6.
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the defendants to flout the new ATD standards, 246 or to unilaterally
change them will result in a motion for injunctive relief cognizable
under the court's continued jurisdiction.
B.

The State of Michigan and the City of Detroit

The suit against the Michigan State Police Department's political
surveillance activities was brought at a particularly propitious time, just
after the Watergate scandal, and in a favorable venue, the state courts of
Michigan.2 4 7 Benkert v. Michigan State Police,248 was initiated by a Michigan consumer advocate who accidentally discovered that the state police
had been investigating his organization. 24 9 He and his coplaintiffs in
the case were at first extraordinarily successful in the state court. In
granting the plaintiffs' partial summary judgment, the court abolished
the state police red squad by holding unconstitutional under the Michigan and United States Constitutions all the provisions of Michigan law
that authorized the squad, together with some substantive provisions,
250 It
such as a communist control act and an old criminal anarchy law.
is perhaps a measure of the strength of popular support for this result
that the state never appealed the Benkert decision and the legislature has
not sought to circumvent its effect. 25 ' The state police apparently have
246 The ATD standards loosely track the framework of the Stipulated Consent Decree
and Judgment. They provide for a "preliminary investigation" upon "reasonable suspicion."
Id app A, § IV(A)(1), at 7. Such an investigation may include the use of plainclothes surveillance, but not of undercover infiltrators. Id app. A, § IV(A)(5), (6), at 8. The latter may
only be used in a "full investigation," after approval by the Chief of Police and a Committee
of the Police Commission, id. app. A, § IV(B)-(D), at 9-17, and on a showing of "probable
cause to believe," see id app. A, § I(M), at 5; supra text accompanying note 240 (defining
standard). The police may disseminate information only to law enforcement agencies except
that they may supply limited information to private organizations to protect the safety of
employees and property, or where disruption may affect the organization. Id app. A, § VI, at
21-23.
247 See generally Jacobs & Soble, A Blow Against the Red Squads, NATION, Feb. 14, 1981, at
168.
248
No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Ct. June 9, 1976) (order granting partial summary judgment).
249 See Stickgold, Yesterday's Paranoiais Today's Reality: Documentation of Police Surveillance of
FirstAmendment Activity, 55 U. DET. J. URB. L. 877 (1978) (summarizing facts of Benkert case).
250 See Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Ct. June 9,
1976) (order granting partial summary judgment). The laws affected were MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 28.51-56, 30.101-105, 750.46-48, 752.311-315, 752.321-332 (1968). The court
does not specify in the order on what grounds the laws were found unconstitutional.
251
In fact the legislature repealed all the laws affected by the decision: MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 28.51-.56 (1968), repealedby 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts 571, § 1; MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 30.101-.105 (1968), repealed by 1978, Mich. Pub. Acts 268, § 25101; MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. §§ 750.46-.48 (1968), repealed by 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts 571, § 1; MICH. COMP.
LAWs ANN. §§ 752.311-.315 (1968), repealedby 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts 571, § 1; MICH. COMP.
LAWs ANN. §§ 752.321-752.332 (1968), repealedby 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts 571, § 1. See also
Stuart,Michigan to Release Its FilesAbout PoliticalSurveillance, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1980, at 10,
col. 1.
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not reinstituted a political squad since that time.25 2
By the time the Benkert court entered its judgment against the state
police in 1976, the plaintiffs had added as defendants the Detroit City
Police, who had collected political intelligence files through a special
squad. After the judgment, the plaintiffs and defendants negotiated for
several years about the disposition of the state and city red squads' old
files, before they agreed on a partial settlement.2 53 The defendants
agreed to notify all persons and organizations named in the files by
mail, as well as to publish notices in some fifteen newspapers.2 54 Those
who responded to the notice by requesting access to a file were to receive
the complete record, with the exception of the names of informers and
255
officers and "highly personal information" about third parties.
The partial settlement appears to provide subject persons and
groups virtually complete access to their files, without any shield or
loophole by which the police could refuse disclosure. It does not, however, eliminate the problem of political spying by the Detroit Police, still
unresolved. Although Mayor Coleman Young abolished the political
unit of the Detroit Police Department by fiat, 256 he did not dispose of
the legal issue of the powers of the police to engage in such surveillance.
Attempts to obtain through legislation systematic and ongoing
standards to govern the Detroit Police Department's political surveillance ran into difficulties akin to those encountered in Los Angeles. In
1981, the Detroit City Council passed an ordinance similar in effect to
the judicial decrees entered in other cities and the ordinance enacted in
Seattle. 257 The ordinance prohibited all political surveillance except
when "unavoidably necessary" for a criminal investigation, upon a standard of reasonable suspicion, and upon the written permission of the
Chief of Police.25 8 The Detroit Police, however, like their Los Angeles
252 The Michigan state legislature went so far as to prevent the state police from participating in interstate law enforcement intelligence gathering unless certain narrowly defined
conditions are met. For example, a law enforcement agency in Michigan may only supply
information to an interstate law enforcement intelligence organization that is established by
an act of Congress or by act of another state legislature or the Michigan legislature. In addition, these organizations must conform to strict procedural guidelines. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 752.1-6 (1980); see also infa note 307 and accompanying text.
253 See Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Ct. Dec.
22, 1980) (order and method of notification and content of files).
254 See id at 2-4.
255 See id at 5-6.
256 See Veto Statement from Coleman A. Young, Mayor of Detroit, to the Detroit City
Council (Dec. 11, 1981) (explaining veto of anti-surveillance ordinance) [hereinafter cited as
Veto Statement].
257 See in/a notes 267-300 and accompanying text.
258 See Detroit, Mich., Anti-Surveillance Ordinance (Dec. 3, 1981) (vetoed Dec. 11,
1981); Council OK's limit on police spying, Detroit Free Press, Dec. 4, 1981, at A3, col. 1. The
ordinance also provided for a civil remedy by injunction or damages similar to the provision
successfully passed in Seattle. See in/a text accompanying note 290.
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counterparts, are part of the municipal executive branch and are supervised by a Board of Commissioners appointed by the Mayor. 259 Mayor
Young vetoed the measure on the ground that it would interfere with
the prerogatives of the executive and his appointed commissioners. In
justifying his veto, the Mayor also argued that the terms of the restrictions on political surveillance were "vague" and that the bill would prevent the Detroit Police from cooperating in intelligence work with other
2 60
agencies that did not operate under such restrictions.
Mayor Young branded the law "unnecessary" because he could
prevent the abuse of police intelligence without legislative intervention.
To demonstrate this assertion, the Mayor closed his veto statement with
an instruction to the Board to adopt a general order reaffirming the
limits on surveillance activities. 26 1 At the beginning of 1982, the police
department produced a brief order prohibiting investigations into "beliefs, opinions, attitudes, statements, associations and activities" of persons or organizations except when they are "reasonably suspected of
violation of the law.

' 262

Understandably, critics of political surveillance

were dissatisfied with the order. At this writing, the ordinance is being
redrafted in an attempt to meet the mayor's objections, 263 and the portion of the Benkert case involving the Detroit Police is being prosecuted
in hopes of securing a judicial solution.
C.

Seattle

The campaign to control political surveillance in Seattle began, as
it did in Los Angeles and Memphis, with the police department's destruction of documents in the aftermath of Watergate. In 1974, the Acting Chief of Police disclosed to the Seattle City Council that he had
destroyed hundreds of intelligence files264-a

revelation that triggered

an outcry from citizens who had not even realized that political files
existed. In response to public pressure, the Council began to review the
structure of the Seattle Police Intelligence Unit. Meanwhile, the Coalition on Government Spying, a citizen reform group, began to extract
the records from the police, first through a demand under a state disclo259
260
261

See Veto Statement, sufira note 256, at 3.
See id at 2-3.
See id. at 3-4.

262 Chief of Police, Detroit Police Dep't, Special Order No. 82-1, at 1 (Jan. 7, 1982)
(regarding surveillance). The order also calls for a review of departmental practices and procedures every three months by the Chief of Police to ensure compliance with the order. The
Chief is to submit a written report to the Commissioners after each review. See id
263
Conversation with Howard Simon, Executive Director, ACLU of Michigan (Sept. 26,
1983).
264 See Spitzer & Kipp, The Mayor's 18-Month Review of the Seattle Police Investigations Ordinance, Ordinance No. 108333 (Seattle Municipal Code, ch. 14.12), at 1-3 (July 1,
1981) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as Mayor's Review]; Coalition on Government Spying, Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance 1-2 (Mar. 1980).
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sure law265 and then through a lawsuit. 266 The Coalition's constant
pressure apparently spurred the Seattle City Council to take further action. In 1979, fifty-six months after the police chief first disclosed the
existence of political files, the Council actually passed, and the Mayor
267
signed, an ordinance to control police surveillance.
The director of the ACLU for the State of Washington explains the
radical difference between the results obtained in Detroit and Los Angeles and those achieved in Seattle by pointing out that Seattle is a relatively small and cohesive city with a strong sense of "clean
government. '268 The relative success of the Seattle activists may also
have resulted in part from the fact that Seattle has no administrative
body like the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners to generate an
appearance of remedial action while actually insulating the police bureaucracy from effective control.
The Seattle ordinance,2 69 like other reform documents drafted in
the seventies, prohibits purely political surveillance. It provides that
"[n]o person shall become the subject of the collection of information on
the account of a lawful exercise of a constitutional right or civil liberty" 270 and that "no information shall be collected or used for political
purposes."'2 71 The ordinance mandates that the police may collect "restricted information," defined as the political or religious beliefs or activities of an organization or individual, 2 72 only in connection with
criminal investigations and the protection of dignitaries, 273 except for
incidental references to such beliefs and activities in connection with
2 74
routine reports.
265

WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17 (1974).

266 It's About Time v. Seattle Police Dep't, No. 830452 (King County Ct. filed June 27,
1979).
267 SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 14.12 (1980) (Seattle, Wash., Police Intelligence
Ordinance 108333 (1979)) (amended by Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 109237 (1980)).
268 Telephone interview with Kathleen Taylor, Director of the ACLU for the State of
Washington (July 15, 1983). It is worth noting that this is not the sort of compliment that
local ACLU directors lightly pay to city governments.
269 SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 14.12 (1980). Similar ordinances have been proposed in municipalities other than Seattle, including Detroit, New York, and the District of
Columbia. For a record of such efforts, together with a model ordinance, see Berman, Draft
Model Anti-Surveillance Legislation (Feb. 1, 1977) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the
Center for National Security Studies).
270
SEATTLE, WASH. MUN. CODE § 14.12.020(A) (1980).
271
Id § 14.12.020(B).
272 Id § 24.12.030(K). "Restricted information" also includes lists of an organizations
members and contributors, and the fact of individuals' membership in an organization. Additionally, the ordinance restricts the collection of information about a person's sexual practices or orientation, except in cases of sex-related crimes or where the information may
identify a fugitive. Ste id § 14.12.130; see also id § 14.12.140 (limiting receipt and transmission of private sexual information).
273 See id § 14.12.150.
274 See id § 14.12.080.
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In a criminal investigation, the ordinance requires a police officer of
the rank of lieutenant or higher to authorize in writing the collection of
restricted information upon a showing of a "reasonable suspicion that
the subject of the restrictedinformation has engaged in, is engaging in, or is
about to engage in unlawful activity. '275 The authorization must state
the legal violation under investigation, the nature of the reasonable suspicion, and the relevance of the restricted information. 276 The authorization expires in ninety days2 7 7 and may be renewed only by the chief of
2 78
police.
The Seattle ordinance provides that the collection of restricted information in connection with the protection of a dignitary may be authorized only by the police chief upon a showing of "reasonable
suspicion that the subject of the restrictedinformation could pose a threat
to the life or safety of a visiting official or dignitary." 279 The authorization must be in writing and conform to requirements similar to those
280
applicable in criminal investigations.
Under the ordinance, police may use infiltrators and informants in
connection with either a criminal or dignitary protection investigation,
provided that the written authorization explains the need for such action. 28 1 To introduce an infiltrator into a political, religious, community, or civil liberties organization, however, the police chief must
specifically authorize the use of the infiltrator and explain why the infiltration is necessary and how it will avoid "unreasonable infringement
'282
upon . . . rights, liberties, and freedoms.
The Seattle ordinance permits the police to transmit restricted information to another government agency pursuant to a prosecutor's request or a court order. 283 The police may also disseminate information
to a government agency upon a showing sufficient to trigger an authori28 4
zation for criminal investigation or dignitary protection.
The ordinance provides for appointment by the Mayor and the
City Council of a civilian auditor 285 who audits the files at unscheduled
275

Id § 14.12.150(C)(1) (emphasis in original).

276

Id

§ 14.12.160.

Id § 14.12.150.
278 Id § 14.12.170.
279 Id § 14.12.230(A) (emphasis in original).
280 Id Restricted information may be collected for dignitary protection without authorization from other criminal justice agencies or from persons planning a demonstration or other
public sources. Id § 14.12.220.
281 See id §§ 14.12.210(A) (criminal), 14.12.150-.190 (dignitary).
282
Id § 14.12.250(B)(3).
283 See id § 14.12.200.
284 Id The section does not say that restricted information may not be transferred to
other persons, but it is fair to imply such a restriction from the language of the section.
285 See id § 14.12.3 10.
277
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intervals not exceeding 180 days. 28 6 The auditor's duties include examining all authorizations and making a random check of police surveillance files. 287 The auditor must report to the Mayor and notify any
victim of an investigation conducted in violation of the ordinance. 288
The Chief of the Department also must make an annual statistical re289
port to the Mayor.
The Seattle ordinance is extremely similar in structure, and even in
some of its wording, to the Chicago decree negotiated months later. On
a substantive level, the Chicago decree contains some requirements for
authorization and minimization that the Seattle statute does not. The
ordinance, however, contains one notable provision that no court decree
shares; it provides that the city may be held civilly liable for damages
accruing from willful violations of the principal provisions of the ordinance but it specifically bars recovery against individual officers. 290 A
court decree probably could not provide for prospective civil remedies in
a like manner.
Eighteen months after the ordinance became effective, the Mayor
of Seattle issued his first status report,2 9 t noting that everyone concerned
had been following the ordinance. The Mayor had appointed a civilian
auditor, who had twice audited all the authorizations and other depart292
ment files without finding substantial violations of the ordinance.
The police chief had made his statistical report, stating that although no
authorizations had been issued for dignitary protection investigations,
293
eleven authorizations for criminal investigations had been granted.
One of the problems noted in the Mayor's report was the "'chilling
effect' the Ordinance had on Department Personnel. '294 This effect was
a natural reaction to a complex new statute that was designed to instill
286

See id § 14.12.330(A).

287

Id § 14.12.330(B)(1).

288 Id § 14.12.340.
289 Id § 14.12.380.
290 See id § 14.12.350-.360. Organizations or individuals have a right of action against
the City of Seattle for injuries caused by department personnel acting willfully and improperly within the scope and course of their duties, which includes collecting restricted or private
sexual information, using an infiltrator, inciting crime, or communicating derogatory information in violation of the other provisions of the ordinance. See id § 14.12.350(A). The
ordinance also mandates administrative disciplinary proceedings for officers who violate the
ordinance. See id § 14.12.390-.400.
291 See Mayor's Review, upra note 264. The Mayor's review is mandated by the ordinance. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.12.410.

See Mayor's Review, supra note 264, at 7-12.
Id at 9. The number of authorizations refused, if any, is not noted. The estimated
cost of the law's administration was approximately $300,000, consisting chiefly of expenses for
"time lost" at a two-day seminar conducted to familiarize all police personnel with the new
ordinance. Id at 12-13.
292
293

294

Id

at 14.
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some hesitation in police officers conducting surveillance activities. Accordingly, the report recommended no major changes.
A more significant problem was the reported refusal of certain "law
enforcement agencies," most notably, the Law Enforcement Information Unit (LEIU), to share information with the Seattle police because
of the civilian audit. 295 Until 1978, the Seattle Police Department was a
member in good standing of the LEIU, a nominally autonomous body
through which police departments share criminal intelligence. 296 Then,
just prior to passage of the ordinance, V. L. Bartley, an officer in the
Seattle Police Intelligence Unit wrote to the LEIU, noting the pending
lawsuit and review of intelligence practices by the City Council and adding: "I am forwarding our LEIU files to you since I can no longer
assure their security. Please retain the cards until the situation here improves or until we are forced to resign from LEIU membership." 297 The
officer's curiously abject tone was repeated in a letter sent by the Seattle
Police Department to the LEIU in August of 1980:
We realize that L.E.I.U. is faced with a difficult decision regarding
Seattle's continued participation in the organization, however, we can
only say that we trust you will make the right decision, we will understand the98 reason for that decision and, of course, we will have to live
with it.

2

In October of 1980, the LEIU suspended the Seattle Police Department's membership. The department promptly began to agitate for an
exemption of LEIU material from the civilian audit so the department
could be readmitted to the organization. The circumstances strongly
suggest that the department engineered the suspension to give it leverage in its lobby for an amendment to the ordinance. 299 Neither the
Mayor, in his first status report, nor the City Council staff recommended
the exemption, believing that reinstatement in the LEIU could be
achieved by less drastic means. Nevertheless, the department's supporters were able to push through an exemption from civilian audit for
3 00
LEIU materials.
The Seattle experience, although unique in the annals of attempts
to control political surveillance, illustrates the potential strengths and
See id at 14, 28-33.
See infra text accompanying notes 301-05.
POLICE THREAT, supra note 8, at 86.
298 Letter from Patrick Munter, Lieutenant, Seattle Police Department, to Thomas
Ruxlow, Special Agent, In-Charge Field Operations, Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation
(Aug. 28, 1980).
299 The suspension is difficult to explain otherwise in view of the fact that the LEIU did
not suspend the Chicago department's members although damaging LEIU documents were
revealed to the Chicago plaintiffs' lawyers in discovery.
300
See Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 109237 § (1980) (amending Seattle, Wash., Police Intelligence Ordinance 108333, ch. VII, § 30 (1979)). The Police Chief is made auditor for
LEIU materials. Id.
295
296
297
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weaknesses of the legislative process as an avenue to reform. The ordinance is well-drafted, contains civil damage provisions impossible to include in a judicial decree, and arguably induces more willing
compliance because it is a result of the political process. On the other
hand, opponents of the ordinance have been able to manipulate the
political process to secure its amendment. The amendment exempting
LEIU documents from the civilian audit did not have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the Seattle ordinance, but it may portend
future problems.
V
THE FLIGHT INTO PRIVATE INVESTIGATION

The Seattle Police Department's success in obtaining an exemption
for LEIU material may inspire other local police departments to obtain
surveillance information through private agencies. Employment of private intelligence-gathering agencies might allow local police to effectively continue political surveillance while avoiding inquiries by courts
and municipal investigators.
Shielded from public scrutiny, a private agency may be able to collect political data with impunity. Although the LEIU is nominally private, all of its cooperating members are official law enforcement
agencies and almost all its funding comes from government sources. 30 1
A lawyer in Chicago's Alliaznce suit estimated that at one time, approximately ten percent of the information on the Chicago LEIU records was
30 2 In 1979, the LEIM did attempt to tighten its
political in 3nature.
"guidelines" °3 to exclude political information, but it is impossible to
determine whether member agencies are complying with the guidelines. 3°4 Thus, the LEIU is an example of the possibility of using a pri3 05
vate agency for political surveillance.

Another private intelligence gathering body is Western Goals, a
foundation based in Alexandria, Virginia. Western Goals styles itself
" 'the first and only public foundation to enter this area and fill the
critical gap caused by the crippling of the FBI, the disabling of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities and the destruction of
301

See POLICE THREAT,

supra note 8, at 85.

See id at 87.
303 LEIU, LEIU Guidelines on Collection, Dissemination and Purging of LEIU/IOCI
Index System (1979).
304 See ACLU v. Deukmejian, 32 Cal. 3d 440, 651 P.2d 822, 186 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1982)
(denying ACLU's request for LEIU material because material fell within "intelligence information" exception to California disclosure law).
305 See Peterzell, Nuclear Power and Political Surveillance 77-89 (Jan. 1981) (Center for
National Securities Studies Report No. 105) (canvassing private agencies like LEIU).
302
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crucial government files.' "306 It is a fascinating coda to the discussion
of the Los Angeles political squad to note that detective Jay Paul, who
secreted the LAPD's "purged" intelligence files, is a correspondent
linked to the computerized files of Western Goals. It is not clear
whether Paul fed any of the purged information to Western Goals, but
Paul did obtain political information from Western Goals while there
were surveillance restrictions on the Los Angeles Police Department.
In the final analysis, however, the flight into private investigation is
unlikely to be an effective means of circumventing instruments of control such as court orders, ordinances, or regulations, unless specific exemptions are written into those instruments. The Chicago, Memphis,
and New York settlements were drafted to eliminate possible loopholes
for "cooperative" efforts. 30 7 Even in the absence of such a precaution,
spying conducted by a private agency with government money is a government act and is therefore potentially subject to review and control.
In the long run, such spying is not as much a legal as a practical problem. As in cases involving police spying, the difficulty lies in uncovering
incidents of spying and the persons responsible for them. That problem
will become still more difficult if the use of private agencies becomes a
general phenomenon.
CONCLUSION

The substantive results of all the actions taken in an effort to control local police surveillance, whether embodied in regulations, legislation, or judicial decrees, are generally homogeneous. Purely political,
noncriminal investigations have usually been interdicted, and the dissemination of information has been generally restricted to governmental
or law enforcement personnel. In some instances, elaborate standards
and bureaucratic controls for "mixed" investigations have been
established.
Although the reforms obtained in court decrees and the Seattle ordinance are consistent with the case law, they have gone beyond it in
establishing standards and written accountability for the use of intrusive
investigative methods in political cases. These particular reforms are
306 Sappell, Detective in Spying Case Linked to Birch Leader, L.A. Times, May 24, 1983, at 13,
col. 3 (quoting Western Goals's fund-raising literature).
307 See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 562 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (Decree § 2); Kendrick v. Chandler, No. 76-449, at 5, para. I (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14,
1978); Stipulation of Settlement and Order at 3, § IV, Handchu; Defendants' Amended Responses and Objections to Interrogatories of Socialist Workers Party at 4-5, Handschu. Michigan has passed a law restricting the state police from making use of such private sources. See
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 752.1(d) (Supp. 1983). The Los Angeles settlement is unclear on
the point permitting "multi-agency task force investigations" outside the ATD standards. See
Coalition Against Police Abuse v. Board of Police Comm'rs, No. 243-458, at app. A, § VI
(L.A. County Ct. Feb. 22, 1984).
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especially significant because they establish that it is possible to conceive
and administer controls upon surveillance, and that the police will accept such controls.
Of the three principal avenues for reform, administrative regulation, litigation, and legislation, no one was clearly more effective than
the others. Of the three, administrative remedies constitute the least
satisfactory instrument for reform. Internally administered police
"guidelines" have proved woefully inadequate in cases where the guidelines have actually been put to the test because such administrative rules
are easily ignored or changed. Judicial decrees, because of their injunctive nature, are not subject to the inherent limitations of administrative
guidelines. As public law litigations, however, the cases brought to curtail local police surveillance activities have not been as successful as the
plaintiffs had hoped. None of the cases has resulted in a major change
in the underlying stratum of constitutional law or legislative policy; the
rights recognized in the successful cases have been consistent with the
existing law most favorable to the plaintiffs, without passing radically
beyond it. Local legislation, which in theory seems a solution preferable
to resort to the courts, has not in practice proved much more successful
than litigation. For the most part, critics of political surveillance have
not had the power to obtain favorable results, and in the one city where
an ordinance has been passed, Seattle, the results are much like those
obtained by judicial settlement.
Courts and legislatures have long refused to create controls over
police investigations, reasoning that police or executive discretion in
such matters must be absolute. Any abuses of police discretion were
viewed as the price that had to be paid for effective investigative work.
The workability of the reforms in the cities and states discussed in this
article establish, at the least, that this view does not reflect reality. If
Congress, state legislatures, or the courts are ever to establish more effective controls for surveillance, such as judicial warrants, they will do so
only if they believe those controls are workable. The results in these
cases suggest that controls are workable and point toward more widespread reforms.

